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1996] EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
Well they passed a law in '64 
To give those who ain't got a little more. 
But it only goes so far 
Because the law don't change another's mind 
When all it sees at the hiring time 
Is the line on the color bar. 
That's just the way it is 
Some things will never change 
That's just the way it is 
But don't you believe them. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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A celebration? A vigil? A wake? In 1994, how should one have 
observed the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 the oldest of the federal employment 
discrimination laws?3 In the years bracketing the anniversa­
ry-1993 and 1995-the United States Supreme Court decided two 
cases that escalate the ongoing subordination of Title VII and other 
federal employment discrimination laws to a much older legal 
doctrine. 
On one side are power, property, and prerogative-the ultimate 
manifestation of which is the legal doctrine known as employment 
at will. On the other side are the federal statutes and policies 
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on specified 
invidious characteristics.4 The two contending forces have waged 
1 BRUCE R. HORNSBY, The Way It Is, on THE WAY IT IS (RCA Records 1986). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
3 See Major Impact of Title VII ls Cited as Seminar Marks 30-Year Anniversary, DAILY 
LAB. REP., June 28, 1994, at C-1 to C-3 (recounting efforts of civil rights litigators in 
development of EEO movement). 
4 I use "federal employment discrimination law" to refer primarily to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), § 1981, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (Supp. V 1993). There are, of course, other federal statutes prohibiting employment 
discrimination, but I am most concerned in this Article with the erosion of the disparate 
treatment theory as it applies to the foregoing statutes. 
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war before the Court since 1964.5 Because employment at will 
often is referred to by one of its many aliases, such as management 
prerogatives, it has not always been recognized. In the beginning, 
one might have predicted that employment at will, a common-law 
doctrine, would be overmatched when opposing the employment 
discrimination statutes, which are positive law enacted by Con­
gress, and the strong public policy that is embodied in those 
statutes.6 This perception, however, has proven to be wrong. 
Employment at will now has won so many battles before the 
Supreme Court that the war may almost be over.7 
Although some may hold out hope that Congress again will take 
5 Title VII was originally passed in 1964. Prior to that time, employment at will battled 
and routed another piece of federal labor law: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (discussing 
subordination of NLRA's statutory rights to employment at will). 
6 See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A 
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 70 (1990) ("At first blush, it 
seems almost inherently inconsistent to speak of the survival of common-law economic and 
political premises in light of a statutory scheme which, while stopping short of requiring just 
cause for discharge, is an undoubted encroachment on the doctrine of employment at will." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
7 In recent years, several scholars have questioned the continued viability of Title VII as 
a weapon for combatting employment discrimination and achieving equal opportunity in 
employment. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, 
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 386 (1995) (arguing Title VII, as interpreted and 
enforced, is no match in battle for civil rights against forces that have limited employment 
opportunities of African Americans); see also D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title 
VII, Equality, and the Fin De Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2318 (1994) ("Title VII is the 
juridical equivalent of the last fading smile of a Cheshire cat of social justice that has long 
since disappeared."). Professor Rutherglen, in a recent essay, questioned whether the 
concept of "discrimination" has been stretched so far beyond its commonly understood 
meaning that prohibitions of discrimination alone no longer can effectively redress the 
various manifestations of inequality in employment. George Rutherglen, Discrimination and 
Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 139-40 (1995). 
In a 1991 article, Professors John Donohue and Peter Siegelman described an ongoing 
battle between two opposing forces that would determine the future of civil rights in 
employment in the United States. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing 
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983 (1991). Donohue 
and Siegelman identify the United States Congress as the champion of the side favoring 
expansion of federal power to eliminate discrimination. Id. They do not identify a champion 
of the side working for the "relax[ation] or trim[ming] [of the] federal civil rights law," but 
they do state that the group looks to the United States Supreme Court to effect that result. 
Id. I suggest that Hicks and McKennon indicate that the Court has hearkened the pleas of 
that group and taken on the mantle as its champion. See infra notes 183-396 and 
accompanying text (discussing Hicks and McKennon). 
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up the banner of employment discrimination and do battle with the 
Court, those hopes are probably unfounded. Congress sought to 
turn back the Court's assault on federal employment discrimination 
law by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,8 in which Congress 
attempted to overturn several Supreme Court decisions restricting 
the federal statutes' protections against discrimination. 9 Despite 
that response by the legislative branch, the Court has not retreat­
ed; instead, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks10 and McK.ennon 
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. ,11 it redoubled its efforts by 
launching a frontal assault on the stronghold of employment 
discrimination law-the disparate treatment theory. Moreover, 
although past Congresses have championed federal employment 
discrimination law, the current Congress does not ride under that 
banner.12 
In 1993, the Court decided Hicks. In that case, the Court refined 
or redefined (depending on your interpretation of precedent)13 the 
analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green14 for 
disparate treatment cases under Title VII. The Court held that a 
plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plain­
tiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and proves that 
the defendant's articulated reason for the employment action it took 
against the plaintiff is pretextual. 15 
Then, in January 1995, the Court rendered its long-awaited 
decision in McKennon. In that case, the Court rejected the rule 
adopted in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
8 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
principally in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)). 
9 See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96 ("[T)he Civil Rights Act of 1991() has two primary purposes. The 
first is to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protections 
that were dramatically limited by those decisions."). See infra notes 173-182 and 
accompanying text (discussing 1991 Civil Rights Act as response to Court's assault on 
employment discrimination law). 
10 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
11 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). 
12 See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's failure to overturn 
Hicks). 
13 See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (comparing majority's interpretation 
of precedent in Hicks with dissent's interpretation). 
14 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
15 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
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Co. 16 regarding after-acquired evidence. 17 Under the Summers 
treatment of after-acquired evidence, such evidence of wrongdoing 
by an employee, for which the employee would have been fired (or 
not hired), barred the plaintiff from being awarded any remedy in 
an employment discrimination action. Although at first blush 
McKennon appears to be a victory for victims of employment 
discrimination, it is a Pyrrhic victory: the Court in McKennon went 
on to hold that after-acquired evidence can be relevant to limit the 
remedies available to a plaintiff who proves employment discrimi­
nation.18 
Although Hicks, a five-to-four decision, was widely viewed as a 
devastating defeat for federal employment discrimination law, 
McKennon, a unanimous decision, may not be seen as the defeat 
that it is.19 I argue that McKennon is cut from the same cloth as 
Hicks and prior cases subordinating employment discrimination law 
to employment at will. I contend, however, that McKennon is, in 
16 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
17 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995). 
18 Id. at 886. 
19 See Kenneth R. Davis, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: A Dubious Defense in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 365, addendum (1995) (praising both 
Court's rejection of Summers rule and its adoption of date-of-discovery approach to limiting 
backpay-approach advocated by article); Adria S. Zeldin, Survey of Recent United States 
Supreme Court Decisions on Employment Discrimination Law, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 921, 
924 (1995) (characterizing Court's decision in McKennon as pro-plaintiff); Pamela M. Martey, 
Note, "The Last Temptation is The Greatest Treason: To Do the Right Deed far the Wrong 
Reason": After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Claims: McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1031, 1058-60 (1995) (arguing 
Court's decision upholds policies of federal employment discrimination laws); 1993-94 
Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 305, 399 (1995) (asserting 
Court's decision "upholds the legal rights of the employer . . .  yet still provides appropriate 
relief to victims of unlawful discrimination"); see also Samuel A. Mills, Note, Toward an 
Equitable After-Acquired Evidence Rule, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1525 (1994) (advocating, prior 
to McKennon, adoption of date-of-discovery limitation on backpay). But see Kenneth A. 
Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive Dissonance, 60 Mo. L. 
REV. 89, 165 (1995) (praising Court's rejection of after-acquired evidence as complete defense, 
but decrying Court's determination that such evidence is relevant to reduction of backpay); 
George M. Sullivan & Edward J. Harrick, The Resolution of the After-Acquired Evidence 
Controversy, 46 LAB. L.J. 286, 287 (1995) (arguing that although decision "was widely 
heralded as a resolution favoring employees, closer scrutiny reveals that the decision may 
actually favor employers"); Labor Law: Attorney Finds Supreme Court More Pro-Employee 
Than Appeals Courts, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 16, 1995, at A-2 (discussing comments of AFL­
CIO General Counsel Laurence Gold, who, while recognizing positive side of McKennon 
decision for employees, stated "it's not clear who won the war"). 
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several ways, a more insidiously harmful decision for employment 
discrimination law than is Hicks and a more blatant proclamation 
that employment at will trumps employment discrimination law. 
Moreover, theMcKennon Court's cavalier rejection of reinstatement 
and potential limitation of backpay, the remedies crucial to 
employment discrimination law's public policy objective, are 
significant steps in a movement intimately related to the subordi­
nation of discrimination law to employment at will: the privatiza­
tion of employment discrimination law.20 If the Court continues 
this campaign, the federal employment discrimination statutes will 
be reduced to mere statutory tort actions. This characterization 
renders them even more vulnerable to subordination to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. The statutes will become just another 
tort exception to employment at will. 
Part II of this Article examines the contending forces in this war. 
It posits that the power of employment at will should not be 
surprising in view of the doctrine's conquest of an older federal law, 
the National Labor Relations Act.21 Part III identifies the genesis 
of the Supreme Court's subordination of federal employment 
discrimination law to employment at will and traces the escalation 
of this campaign from the late 1970s through the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part III next discusses the Court's 
surprising resumption of its relentless assault on discrimination 
law after the enactment of the 1991 Act. It juxtaposes the Court's 
decisions in Hicks andMcKennon and posits that each is part of the 
ongoing and escalating subordination of federal employment 
discrimination law to employment at will. Finally, Part IV looks to 
the future of employment discrimination law and considers ways of 
preventing the irreversible subjugation of discrimination law to 
employment at will. 
20 See Cheryl K. Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment 
Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibil­
ity, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193-202 (1993) (arguing after-acquired evidence arose as part of 
general recharacterization of Title VII as private tort remedy). 
21 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-69 (1988). 
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II. THE CONTENDING FORCES: THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
An antidiscrimination law is the an tithesis of freedom of 
contract, a principle that allows all persons to do busi­
ness with whomever they please for good reason, bad rea­
son, or no reason at all. 22 
A. POWER, PROPERTY, AND PREROGATIVE 
"Bill," [said an assistant superintendent} to a foreman 
[early in the twentieth century}, "has anyone been fired 
from this shop today?" "No," the foreman meekly replied. 
''Well, then, fire a couple of 'em!" barked the assistant 
superintendent, in a voice that carried. "It'll put the fear 
of God in their hearts. 1123 
The classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine was 
proclaimed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1884: 
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell 
where they please, and to discharge or retain employe[­
e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad 
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act 
per se ... .  
. . . All may dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they 
many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for 
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of 
legal wrong. 24 
If one believes the recent scholarly writing, employment at will 
is a once-mighty tyrant in labor and employment law that both is 
22 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992). 
23 SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 21 (1985). 
24 Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, 
Hutton v. Wat�rs, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
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despised by many and is gradually losing its sovereignty.25 
Indeed, the doctrine does seem to be beset on every side, with both 
its lineage and pedigree being challenged26 and "exceptions" to the 
doctrine being recognized in all jurisdictions with increasing 
frequency. 27 Among the recognized exceptions are wrongful dis-
25 The academic assault on employment at will, and calls for limitations on the doctrine, 
can be traced back to Professor Lawrence Blades's 1967 article, Employment at Will vs. 
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1404 (1967). Since the publication ofBlades's article, academic criticism of employment 
at will has proliferated. See, e.g. , Theodore J. St. Antoine, Employment-at-Will-Is the Model 
Act the Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179, 180 n.6 (1993) (citing relevant articles). Professor 
St. Antoine concludes that the common-law modifications of employment at will are 
inadequate to protect most employees, and he urges state legislatures to adopt the Model 
Employment Termination Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. Id. passim. 
The most vocal defender of employment at will in the academic community has been 
Professor Richard Epstein. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (discussing role of contract at will in employment relations). 
Not surprisingly, Epstein also has been one of the harshest critics of employment 
discrimination law. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22 (arguing anti-discrimination law 
interferes with freedom of contract); Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden 
Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing anti-discrimination law should not apply 
to private employers in competitive markets); Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production 
Sideshow: Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085 
(1995) (criticizing Richard H. McAdams's Cooperation & Confl.ict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995), and arguing that 
only repeal of civil rights laws will achieve key social aim of"minimiz[ing] the level of public 
force in human affairs"). 
For a middle-ground view that employment at will should not be categorically maintained, 
but neither should a general good cause condition for termination be recognized, see 
generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (arguing courts in many cases are applying, 
and should apply, life-cycle framework to protect both employers and employees from 
opportunistic behavior). 
26 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125-27 (1976) (criticizing treatise writer Horace Gay Wood's influential 
proclamation of employment-at-will rule as not supported by cases Wood cited, as incorrectly 
stating uniformity of application of rule in United States rather than contrary English rule, 
and as giving no policy rationale for rule). But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The 
Doubtful Provenance of -Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (arguing 
Wood "just told it like it was"). 
27 See generally STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
chs. 2-4 (1993) (discussing exceptions to employment at will); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance 
Interest In Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 687-89 (1988) (discussing judicially recognized 
exceptions to employment at will as examples of situations in which law transfers "limited 
set of property interests from the employer to the employee [to] protect[] the reliance 
interests of the more vulnerable party"). 
314 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:305 
charge in violation of public policy,28 intentional infliction of 
emotional distress 29 invasion of privacy,30 breach of the covenant 
, 
. . 
of good faith and fair dealing, 31 detrimental reliance or promissory 
estoppel,32 and implied-in-fact contr��ts.33 Although employment 
at will may be "besieged" by recogn1t�on of common-I!� toz:t and 
contract theories of recovery as exceptions to the rule, 1romcally, 
the hoary doctrine is on the offensive against federal employment 
discrimination law, rapidly regaining whatever territory w8:s once 
taken from it by the federal statutes. Employment at will has 
shown an uncommon common-law strength when pitted against 
those laws. What is the source of that strength? 
Several theories have been offered to explain the development 
and adoption of employment at will in the United States.35 
Regardless of the theory to which one subscribes, most scholars 
28 E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Nees v. 
Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975). 
29 E.g., Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992); Boedwig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 
P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
30 E.g., Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989); K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 
677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
31 E.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Fortune v. National 
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
32 E.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
33 E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
34 I used "besieged" to capture the sense of the once impregnable principle being 
challenged from all sides. Despite the advent of much-ballyhooed exceptions, employment 
at will remains the default rule. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 27, at 3. Employment at will, 
while no longer invincible, still reigns over employment law. Professor Moller, surveying the 
tort and contract incursions on employment at will, concludes that these changes have not 
effected a major change in the law or a significant shift in the balance of power in the 
workplace. Sid L. Moller, The Revolution That Wasn't: On the Busines� as Usual Aspects 
of Employment at Will, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 441, 494-95 (1993). 35 For recent scholarship surveying the theories and offering a new theory, see Andrew 
P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of 
Employment at-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994). The theories considered and rejected by 
Professor Morriss include: the rule was a natural product of nineteenth century laissez faire 
capitalism; the rule was a tool with which capitalists exercised control over the new middle 
class of white collar workers; the rule resulted from less class prejudice and weaker trade 
unions � the 
_
United States than in Britain; and the rule sprang from the widely read work 
of treatise wnter Horace Wood. Id. at 681, 683-96. Morriss posits that employment at will 
was adopted by state courts to serve as a gatekeeper. Id. at 753. The courts recognized that 
�ey lacked th� competence to eval�ate the termination decisions of employers; thus, the at­
will rule provided an easy solution, quickly disposing of employment cases involving 
indefinite-term employment. Id. 
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agree that the law's recognition of an employer's virtually unbridled 
prerogative is based on common-law principles or baselines36 
regarding property ownership and freedom of contract: the 
workplace is the property of the employer, and in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary, the employer may do as it wishes with 
its property. 37 The employer should be free to use its property 
without government interference38 because there is no public 
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (analyzing 
common-law baselines of constitutional analysis). Professor Sunstein uses the term 
"baseline" to refer to the starting points or underlying assumptions that lead to formulation 
of legal doctrine and rules. Id. Several scholars have adopted Sunstein's terminology and 
approach to examine the baselines for the employment-at-will doctrine. E.g., Jack M. 
Beermann & Joseph W. Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of 
Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 914-15 (1989); Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 66; 
Jones, supra note 7, at 2324 n.36. 
37 JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AsSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 32-33, 91-94 
(1983); Beermann & Singer, supra note 36, at 936-56; Blades, supra note 25, at 1416-19; 
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 66-70; Jones, supra note 7, at 2316-17, 2350; Karl E. 
Klare, The Public I Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1366-67 (1982); 
Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown 
of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 375 (1986); Singer, supra note 27, at 633-37. In 
his defense of employment at will, Professor Epstein argues that it maximizes freedom of 
contract because it recognizes both "that the employer is the full owner of his capital and 
[that] the employee is the full owner of his labor." Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, supra note 25, at 955; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 20-24 (defending the Lockean 
position of self-ownership). Although Professor Epstein emphasizes the freedom-of-contract 
rationale in support of employment at will, he clearly recognizes the important property law 
foundation in employers' common-law prerogatives. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law 
for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1388-
89 (1983) (criticizing balancing tests for determining whether employer has violated§ 8(aX1) 
of National Labor Relations Act by denying access to its property as "cut[ting] back upon the 
absolute power to exclude that is the hallmark of any system of private property"). 
In the debate over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, opponents argued that the Act 
would "infringe[] upon the rights of private property and the rights of American citizens to 
choose their associates." 110 CONG. REC. 4744 (1964) (ststement of Sen. Russell). The 
Congressional Record is rife with similar statements by opponents of the Civil Rights Act. 
E.g., id. at 4762 ("I am opposed to telling businessmen how they may use their private 
property and whom they may hire and fire.") (statement of Sen. Hill). See generally Samuel 
A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 
9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL 'y 137, nn.31-34 (1995) (discussing and quoting from 
debate over passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
38 Professors Blumoff and Lewis postulate that the Court, as constituted during the 
"Reagan Revolution," is committed to common-law baselines of neutrality and noninter­
ference. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 67-70. Blumoff and Lewis, concurring with 
Sunstein, trace the judicial imprimatur on these principles to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905). Id.; see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2354 (arguing that, under traditional preroga­
tives of employers, "[t]he employer's liberty to be free in his domain of any constraints 
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interest in the employment relationships between a private 
1 . d" 1 39 emp oyer an its emp oyees. 
Professor Klare has identified three types of rights and powers 
that usually are associated with property ownership: the power to 
exclude; the right of privacy; and use of the workplace (including 
the right to manage the work process and to make investment 
decisions).40 Thus, the power to terminate for any reason is not 
the only employer right based on the employer's ownership of the 
workplace. It is, however, the quintessential expression of 
employer prerogative,41 and from the employee's perspective, it is 
the most important one. 42 The termination power of the employer 
is part of the power to exclude others from its property.43 Con­
versely, exceptions to employment at will infringe on the employer's 
property right to exclude; thus, they result in a transfer of a part 
of the employer's property rights to the employee.44 
Employment at will, steeped as it is in property and contract law 
principles, has garnered support from economic theorists, who view 
it as promoting efficiency in several ways. 45 First, economic 
theorists see the power to exclude others, and the assurance that 
the government will not intervene to prevent such exclusion, as 
inducing owners of property to invest and put their resources to 
anchors a notion that in the employer's domain he should be free of the government's 
intruding gaze"). 
39 Linzer, supra note 37, at 375; Singer, supra note 27, at 633-34. One Senate opponent 
of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act argued that Title VII "would be an unwarranted 
invasion of private enterprise and private property rights." UO CONG. REC. 5093 (1964) 
(statement of Sen. Robertson). 
'°Klare, supra note 37, at 1367-71. 
41 Cf. Jones, supra note 7, at 2343 n.llO ("Of course, the traditional prerogative of the 
employer was to be free from all constraints on who to hire and fire."). 
42 T . . f l ernunat1on rom emp oyment has been described as "a kind of organizational 
equivalent of capital punishment." WILBERT E. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 
28 (1962). 
43 Singer, supra note 27, at 688-89 . 
• 44 Id". Professor Singer argues that such a transfer is justified because it protects the 
reliance mterests of the more vulnerable party in the relationship of employment. Id. at 688-89; see
.
also Be�rmann & Singer, supra note 36, at 947-56 (discussing property rights as an 
allocat1on of nghts between parties in relationship, occasionally to protect needs of less 
powerful party). 
45 E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 22, ch. 8; Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will supra note 25, at
_ 
965-67; Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Terminatio� Rules & Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, ll44 (1989). 
1996] EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 317 
optimal use. 46 Second, they argue that unlimited managerial 
discretion gives employees, who are risk averse, incentive to be pro­
ductive and thus makes workers more productive. 47 Third, 
employers who abuse the doctrine (that is, act opportunistically) 
suffer greater reputational losses than employees who act opportun­
istically; thus, there are informal constraints on an employer's 
abuse of employment at will. 48 Fourth, employment at will 
discourages employees from investing too much in a single job and 
thus encourages them to diversify and make better choices as they 
obtain more information about employers.49 Finally, employment 
at will is inexpensive to administer.50 
In view of the common-law baselines undergirding employment 
at will and the efficiency arguments urging resistance to change, 
employment at will does not appear as feeble as the flurry of 
exceptions being recognized would lead one to believe. Moreover, 
an additional factor is likely causing courts to cling to employment 
at will as the basic principle governing the employment relation­
ship. Courts do not wish to become generally involved in evaluat­
ing employers' discharge decisions. Professor Morriss has argued 
that employment at will originally was adopted by courts in the 
United States as a gatekeeper rule because courts did not deem 
themselves competent to evaluate the performance of discharged 
employees, and he thinks this institutional problem persists 
today.51 There is evidence that he is correct: the Supreme Court 
has admonished courts in employment discrimination cases to avoid 
second-guessing employers' business practices because of the courts' 
relative incompetence in that area.52 
46 Beermann & Singer, supra note 36, at 925 (discussing management arguments against 
job security); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
356 (1967); Stephen J. Massey, Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 
541, 557-58 (1984). 
47 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 965; Beermann & Singer, 
supra note 36, at 926. 
48 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 967-68; Beermann & 
Singer, supra note 36, at 926. 
49 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 968-69; Beermann & 
Singer, supra note 36, at 926-27. 
50 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 970-73; Beermann & 
Singer, supra note 36, at 927. 
51 M . 3 orr1ss, supra note 5, at 713, 752-53, 762-63. 
52 See infra notes 136-172 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 
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B. SUBORDINATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT TO EMPLOYERS' COMMON-LAW PREROGATIVES 
The Supreme Court's subordination of employment discrimina­
tion law to employment at will is developed more fully below.53 
This section, however, concentrates on what a formidable foe 
employment at will has proven to be for the other federal labor law 
that threatened its empire. The Supreme Court's subordination of 
federal labor and employment law to the property-based preroga­
tives of the employer is forcefully demonstrated by the elevation of 
the employer's property rights over the rights of employees under 
the National Labor Relations Act54 (NLRA).55 In discussing the 
common-law exceptions to employment at will,56 Professor Klare 
points out that these developments are evidence that the employ­
ment relationship is no longer treated as wholly private.57 Klare 
notes the "curious twist" that, notwithstanding the recognition that 
the employment relationship is not entirely private, courts have 
relied on private-law principles to dilute statutory guarantees 
under the NLRA. 58 
One of the most controversial issues under the NLRA has been 
nonemployee union organizers' right of access to an employer's 
private property to organize employees as part of a union-organiz­
ing campaign. In its decision in Jean Country,59 the National 
Labor Relations Board developed a test that sought to balance the 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), and Court's admonition therein and thereafter about judicial 
incompetence to second-guess employers). Moreover, the gatekeeper rule not only helps 
courts avoid the types of cases they are ill-equipped to address, but also decreases their 
overall caseload. There has been an increasing trend in the federal courts to use summary 
judgment to prune the dockets, and employment discrimination claims have become 
increasingly susceptible to such judicial action. Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired 
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB. 
LAW. 43, 66-67 (1993). 
53 See infra notes 126-396 and accompanying text (discussing Court's subordination of 
discrimination laws to employment at will). 
54 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-69 ( 1988). 
SS A TLESON, supra note 37, at 32, 91-94; Klare, supra note 37, at 1403-05. 
56 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (listing common-law exceptions to 
employment-at-will doctrine). 
57 Klare, supra note 37, at 1362-63. 
58 Id. at 1364. 
59 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). 
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statutory rights of employees (to learn of organizational opportuni­
ties) with the private property rights of the employer.60 The 
Supreme Court rejected the Board's test in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc. 
v. NLRB.61 The majority opinion stressed the property rights of 
the employer and generally denied access. 62 
The relationship between management prerogatives and statuto­
ry rights under the NLRA also is manifested by an employer's right 
to hire permanent replacements for employees engaged in an 
economic strike. The Supreme Court recognized this right in NLRB 
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 63 Many commentators have 
argued against the "Mackay doctrine" on the ground that recogni­
tion of such a right eviscerates the right to strike guaranteed by 
section 7 of the NLRA.64 Notwithstanding such criticism, numer­
ous attempts to overturn Mackay through legislation have failed,65 
and the doctrine has prevailed since 1938. 
The current Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board 
believes that both Lechmere and Mackay are contrary to the 
purposes of the NLRA. Responding to a letter from Republican 
members of the House Economic and Educational Opportunities 
Committee expressing concern regarding his public statements 
60 Id. at 13-14. 61 502 U.S. 527 ( 1992). See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After 
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994) (criticizing Lechmere Court's expansive conception 
of property rights and restrictive conception of employees' § 7 rights). 62 502 U.S. at 535-41. The Court recently decided a related issue, dealing with the 
relationship between rights created by the NLRA and the employer's property right to 
exclude, in NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 ( 1995). The Court 
unanimously held that applicants for jobs who are also paid union organizers are 
"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. at 457. Thus, it can be an unfair labor 
practice to refuse to hire such an applicant because she is a paid union organizer. The Town 
& Country decision is somewhat surprising after Lechmere. 
63 304 U.S. 333 ( 1938). 
64 E.g. , Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 300 
(1991) (arguing Mackay doctrine "makes a mockery of the supposed right to strike"); see also 
Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 547, 567 (asserting that, because of Mackay, "resort to the statutory 'right' to strike 
would be, for many employees, an exercise in permanent job loss, and for the union, an act 
of potential self-immolation"). 
65 See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent 
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. 
L. REV. 8 13, 827 n.74 (1994) (chronicling history of unsuccessful legislative attempts to 
overrule Mackay doctrine). 
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advocating reform of the striker replacement law embodied in 
Mackay, Chairman William Gould stated, "I continue to believe 
that both Lechmere and Mackay are bad law and inconsistent with 
the basic purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, but I am 
committed to the impartial administration of the law as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court. "66 
Still, in terms of the Supreme Court's flouting of congressional 
intent, the subordination of employees' statutory rights under the 
NLRA to employers' common-law prerogatives is not as egregious 
as the subordination of employees' rights under federal employment 
discrimination law. Although many commentators believe the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Mackay and Lechmere are contrary to 
the intent and purpose of the NLRA, Congress, by failing to enact 
legislation to overturn those decisions and return the law to what 
it intended, has not evidenced a similar belief.67 In contrast, 
Congress, through passage of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, respond­
ed to the Court's subordination of rights under employment 
discrimination law. 
Employment at will does not give up territory in its kingdom 
without a fight. The experience with the NLRA, the first federal 
law to attempt to claim some of that territory, reveals that the 
courts pay homage to the common-law doctrine. The story has been 
no different with federal employment discrimination law. 
C. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused 
with a public aura for reasons that are well known . . . .  
Congress has responded to . . .  pernicious misconceptions 
and ignoble hatreds with humanitarian laws formulated 
68 Letter from William B. Gould IV, Chairman, the National Labor Relations Board to 
Reps. Bill Goodling, Harris Fawell, and Pete Hoekstra (Apr. 19, 1995), reprinted in D�LY 
LAB. REP., Apr. 20, 1995, at E-1 to E-4. 
67 Several bills introduced in Congress in the late 1980s and 1990s that would have 
overturned or modified Mackay failed. Even had one passed, Mackay's survival since 1938 
arguably suggests that Congress did not find the case to be such an affront as to require 
immediate action. Moreover, many interpret the amendment of the NLRA by the Landrum­
Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as ratifying Mackay. E.g. , 
Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 289 (1987). 
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to wipe out the iniquity of discrimination in employment, 
not merely to recompense the individuals so harmed but 
principally to deter future violations. 
The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress en­
acted consequently resonate with a forceful public policy 
vilifying discrimination. 68 
321 
The effusive and eloquent passage above is representative of 
what both Congress and the courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have said about federal employment discrimination law. The grand 
and all-encompassing goal of the statutes is self-evident: to 
eradicate discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex, 
religion, national origin, age, or disability.69 How is such a 
complex goal to be achieved? 
Both Congress and the courts have responded by breaking the 
larger goal down into two more functional objectives toward which 
the law historically has been directed. In enacting the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 ,  Congress stated that one of the two primary purposes 
of the Act was to strengthen protections and remedies "to provide 
more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of 
discrimination."70 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 71 the Su­
preme Court declared the purposes of Title VII to be deterrence of 
employment discrimination and "make whole" compensation for the 
victims of discrimination. 72 The Court also paid lip service to 
these purposes in McKennon, noting, "Deterrence is one object of 
[the ADEA and Title VII]. Compensation for injuries caused by the 
prohibited discrimination is another."73 
68 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 3 1 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995). 
69 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391-2394 (stating purpose and reasoning behind Civil Rights Act of 
1964); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) 
(noting common purpose of ADEA and Title VII of eliminating workplace discrimination); 
Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now Exeulpation, 28 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 n.4 (1995) (citing sources stating goal of Title VII). 
70 H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694. The other primary goal was to overturn several Supreme Court 
decisions that "dramatically limited" civil rights protections. Id. 
71 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
72 Id. at 416-19. 
73 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 884. 
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Still unanswered, however, is a vital question: What is discrimi­
nation? What are these humanitarian laws to eradicate? What 
acts are they to deter? For what injurious acts by employers are 
those who are statutorily protected to be compensated? Title VII 
does not define discrimination.74 Although stating that it is an 
unlawful employment practice to take adverse employment action 
"because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin,"75 the Act neither provides guidance as to what a plaintiff 
must prove to establish a violation 76 nor defines those troublesome 
words "because of."77 Rather, Congress left the interpretation of 
what constitutes prohibited discrimination to the courts, which 
subsequently developed two principal theories of recovery under 
Title VII: disparate treatment78 and disparate impact. 79 These 
74 Jones, supra note 7, at 2345 ("Discrimination, the core evil to be addressed, is a figure 
entirely unformed within the empty space framed by the statute."); Rutherglen, supra note 
7, at 127; Turner, supra note 7, at 409. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
76 Jones, supra note 7, at 2345. 
11 See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Miud 
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 22 (1991) (explain­
ing that defining prohibited discrimination hinges on interpreting phrase "because of'). 
78 Disparate treatment theory is also recognized as a theory of recovery under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 
§ 1981. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA­
TION 91-92 (3d ed. 1994) (stating ADEA and Title VII adopt same definition of disparate 
treatment); id. at 140-41 (stating that Supreme Court has adopted unified approach to 
individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII, § 1981, and ADEA); see also Ennis v. 
National Ass'n of Business & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing 
disparate treatment theory under ADA and using proof structure found under Title VII and 
ADEA); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). 
79 The initial judicial recognition of disparate impact under Title VII and the subsequent 
codification of that theory of recovery are discussed infra note 105. Disparate impact is 
statutorily recognized under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A), (b)(6) (Supp. V 1993). 
Impact theory is not available under § 1981. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylva­
nia, 458 U.S. 375, 388 ( 1 982). Some federal courts have either held or assumed that 
disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA. E.g. , Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 
953 (8th Cir. 1994); Fisher v. Transo Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1992). 
The continuing authority of those decisions is dubious, however, in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 1 1 3  S. Ct. 1701 ( 1993). Although the Court 
in Biggins did not hold that disparate impact is inapplicable to ADEA actions, the Court's 
reasoning suggests this result. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit relied on Biggins in holding 
(somewhat ambiguously) that disparate impact is not available as a theory of recovery under 
the ADEA. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1 15 
S. Ct. 2577 (1995). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Francis W. Parker School, 
notwithstanding the EEOC's petition urging the Court to reverse the Seventh Circuit. Age 
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two theories flesh out the prohibited discriminatory practices. 
A plaintiff asserting a disparate treatment claim attempts to 
prove that an employer has treated her less favorably than others 
because of her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.80 A plaintiff proceeding under a disparate treatment 
theory must prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory 
motive or animus. 81 The plaintiff can attempt to prove his case by 
offering either direct evidence of discrimination, such as explicit 
statements or "smoking gun" memos, or by indirect or circum­
stantial evidence.82 Usually, employers, aware of the potential for 
lawsuits under federal employment discrimination law, do not give 
plaintiffs the luxury of relying on direct evidence.83 Accordingly, 
Discrimination: Justices Will Not Review Use of Disparate Impact in ADEA Cases, DAILY 
LAB. REP., June 20, 1995, at E- 1 to E-2. 
80 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Most 
disparate treatment cases are individual disparate treatment cases. A second type of 
disparate treatment case, the pattern-or-practice or systemic disparate treatment case, 
resembles, in some respects, a disparate impact case. In such a case, a plaintiff attempts to 
show that an employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of intentionally discriminatory 
decisions which have resulted in a lower representation of the protected group members in 
the employer's work force than would have resulted had the employer made decisions 
randomly without regard to the protected characteristic. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical 
Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1993) 
(examining issues of pattern-or-practice disparate treatment and statistical analysis therein); 
Turner, supra note 7, at 436-44 (same); see also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 78, at 492-502 
(discussing distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact theories with 
respect to statistical analyses involved). Another type of systemic disparate treatment case 
involves an employer's maintenance of a formal facially discriminatory policy. See ZIMMER 
ET AL., supra note 78, at 193-210. Although both the disparate impact and the systemic 
disparate treatment theories address systemic discrimination, it is important to distinguish 
them. The systemic disparate treatment case requires a finding of intentional discrimina­
tion, whereas the disparate impact case does not. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 78, at 492-93. 
Moreover, business necessity is a defense to a disparate impact claim, but not to a disparate 
treatment claim. Id. at 493 (citing § 703(kX2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(kX2) (Supp. V 1993)). Furthermore, the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
authorizing awards of compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials in cases in which 
such damages are sought applies to only actions alleging "unlawful intentional discrimination 
(not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
81 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
82 See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15 (2d 
ed. 1983) (identifying three types of evidenc�irect, statistical, and comparative-as those 
available to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Turner, s upra note 7, at 432-33 
(demonstrating differences between direct and indirect evidence of discrimination). 
83 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 82, at 15; Turner, supra note 7, at 432. 
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in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,84 the Supreme Court 
developed a framework, consisting of three parts, by which courts 
analyze circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases. 85 
Under the analysis, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination in a case involving failure to hire or pro­
mote by proving the following: 1) the plaintiff belongs to a 
protected class; 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job 
at issue; 3) despite the plaintiff's qualifications, the employer 
rejected him; and 4) after the employer rejected the plaintiff, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applications from persons with qualifications similar to those of 
plaintiff. 86 If a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, a rebuttable 
M 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
86 The McDonnell Douglas analysis apparently does not apply to cases in which plaintiffs 
present direct evidence of discrimination. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 1 1 1, 
112 (1985). In an ironic twist, some argue that, in the aftermath of St. Mary's Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), a plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
cannot prevail without direct evidence of discrimination. E.g. , The Suprem€ Court, 1992 
Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 348 (1993) [hereinafter The Supreme 
Court-Leading Cases] ("Despite Justice Scalia's protestations to the contrary, Hicks effec­
tively requires the plaintiff to show direct evidence of intent." (footnote omitted)); see also 
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 
26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1001 n.12 (1994) (citing lower court decisions interpreting Hicks as 
requiring direct evidence of discriminatory intent); cf. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) ("The majority's scheme greatly disfavors Title VII plaintiffs without the good 
luck to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent."). Hicks does not explicitly impose such 
a requirement, and I think such an interpretation reads too much into the Court's opinion. 
See Brookins, supra note 69, at 965-66 (asserting Hicks does not explicitly or implicitly 
impose such requirement and that it does not exist "if one can still rely on the Court's own 
precedent"). 
A different analysis applies to disparate treatment cases involving so-called mixed motives. 
The Court adopted the analysis for Title VII cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989). See infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text. The mixed-motives analysis 
was modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) & § 2000e-5(gX2XB) 
(Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of differences and similarities between the McDonnell 
Douglas and mixed-motives analyses, see Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1237 
(4th Cir. 1995). 
86 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court was quick to point out that the 
elements of the prima facie case will vary depending on the facts. Id. at 802 n.13. For 
example, the Court in McDonnell Douglas actually stated as the first element of the prima 
facie case that the plaintiff must establish "that he belongs to a racial minority." Id. at 802. 
The Court explained in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 ( 1976), a case 
involving white plaintiffs, that McDonnell Douglas did not restrict Title VII to racial 
minorities. Rather, " 'specification . . .  of the prima facie proofrequired . . .  is not necessarily 
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.' " McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6 
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presumption of intentional discrimination arises. 87 The Court 
bases this presumption on the rationale that the prima facie case 
eliminates the two most common legitimate reasons for not hiring 
a person: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications and a lack 
of an opening for the position being sought. 88 If the plaintiff 
makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
employment action. 89 If the employer satisfies its burden, the 
plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove that the employer's 
articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. 90 The ultimate 
burden of persuasion that the employer intentionally discriminated 
remains with the plaintiff at all times.91 
A plaintiff asserting a disparate impact theory of recovery asserts 
that a facially neutral employment practice (such as a job skills 
test) has a significantly disproportionate adverse effect on a group 
protected by the laws and that the practice cannot be justified by 
"business necessity."92 In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff 
offers statistical evidence to establish that the protected class to 
which the plaintiff belongs is underrepresented in the employer's 
work force in comparison with a relevant labor force from which the 
employer hires or could hire. 93 
Several important distinctions exist between the two theories. 
First, individual disparate treatment is a narrow theory of recov­
ery94 that focuses on adverse decisions regarding the particular 
employee and turns on the "motive" of the decisionmaker, thus 
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13). Furthermore, the elements vary 
depending on the type of adverse employment action taken. 
87 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
88 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 358 n.44 (1977). 
89 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (detailing 
employer's burden of production). 
90 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 
2752 (1993). 
91 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747. 
92 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. "Business necessity" has been redefined several times 
by the Supreme Court and Congress since it was first articulated by the Court. The current 
definition is set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1XAXi} (Supp. 
V 1993). The ADA uses the same definition. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX6) (Supp. V 1993). 
93 Browne, supra note 80, at 482-83; Turner, supra note 7, at 444-45. 
94 Turner, supra note 7, at 431. 
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making it what has been termed a subjective, fault-based theory.95 
Disparate impact theory, in contrast, is an expansive theory,96 
focusing on a practice or procedure rather than on decisions 
regarding a particular employee, and under which motive is said to 
be irrelevant, 97 making it a theory of liability based on an objec­
tive view of fault. 98 Second, statistical evidence may be useful in 
a disparate treatment case, but such evidence is vital to a disparate 
impact case.99 Third, disparate treatment adopts the perspective 
of the perpetrator and demands that a specific violation be identi­
fied, 100 whereas disparate impact adopts the perspective of the 
victim and looks for overall patterns of inequality. 101 The final 
distinction between the two theories, and perhaps the most 
important in terms of current controversies regarding employment 
discrimination law, is that many view the disparate treatment 
theory as attempting to achieve equality of opportunity and the 
disparate impact theory as attempting to achieve equality of 
result. 102 
95 Jones, supra note 7, at 2343 (describing contractarian model of fault, concerned with 
what employer actually thought); see also Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural 
Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary lnfiuences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 
2375 (1994) (explaining that disparate treatment theory is premised on motivation of 
employer and "conceptualize[s] discrimination as the outcome of discrete, biased acts of 
individuals"). 
96 Turner, supra note 7, at 444. 
97 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); 
Blurnoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 13. 
98 Jones, supra note 7, at 2342-43. 
99 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) ("The evidence in these 
'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific 
incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities."); Browne, supra note 80, at 
479 (noting statistical evidence may be central to disparate treatment case that targets 
pattern or practice of intentional discrimination, but such evidence may not be sufficient or 
necessary). 
100 Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 126 (citing Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978)); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2339 
(decrying the paradigm of discrimination defining individual discriminatory decisions as evil 
to be addressed and requiring proof of discriminatory animus as being "[an] outsider's 
viewpoint [and] . . .  the opposite of blacks' perspective"). 
101 Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 126. 
102 Julie 0. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination Cases, 1 6  J. 
CORP. L. 173, 175 (1991); Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 8. I recognize that many people 
believe (and I am not disagreeing with them) that equality of opportunity cannot be achieved 
through use of the disparate treatment theory alone. 
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Disp arate treatment is generally accepted as a meaning of 
discrimination that Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted 
Title VII. As the Court has articulated, "[u]ndoubtedly disparate 
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when 
it enacted Title VII . . . .  "103 Even Professor Epstein, who favors 
repeal of federal employment discrimination law, admits that "a 
practical com p romise" of limiting Title VII race cases to individual 
disparate treatment claims "would honor the orig inal intentions of 
the statute. "104 As Professor Epstein's grudging concession 
suggests, he and others who acknowledge disparate treatment as 
a meaning of discrimination that Congress intended to address in 
Title VII, consider disparate imp act an unwarranted or undesirable 
extension. 105 
The princip al objections to disparate impact theory are based on 
its lack of an intent requirement106 and its objective of achieving 
equality of results.107 Because employers have developed and 
103 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see 
alsu Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing core meaning of discrimination requires intent 
to distinguish groups on basis of specified characteristics; consequently, disparate impact 
theory does not fit easily within concept of discrimination); see also Calloway, supra nqte 85, 
nt 997 (referring to disparate treatment as "the most basic form of discrimination"); 
Cham allas, supra note 95, at 2375 (calling disparate treatment "[t)he most well-established 
theory of liability"). 
104 EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 181. 
1 06  Disparate impact was recognized originally by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). There is considerable debate whether Congress, when it 
1•nncted Title VII, intended to create such a theory of recovery. E.g. , EPSTEIN, supra note 22, 
Al 184-201 (asserting Griggs represents "systematic distortion of the language and outlook" 
of Title VII); Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin 
of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for 
/frform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985). Regardless of one's conclusion on that issue, 
< '.ongress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified the disparate impact theory for Title VII 
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993). 
iQfl EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 160; Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 118. But see Jones, supra 
note 7,  at 2343 (criticizing "mentalistic and subjective" concept of fault). 
io: See, e.g. , Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 14-15 (noting paradox inherent in 
cl1!1parate impact theory that neutrality is equated with discrimination and discussing 
p<-rception that requiring preferential treatment is type of discrimination, the very thing 
prohibited by Title VII); Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 127-30 (pointing out that disparate 
1 mpnct is itself "discrimination" under the ordinary meaning of the term). But see Jerome 
�t Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The "lmpossibili­
:v"  of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 979 (1993) (criticizing "jurisprudence of 
crlebration of the status quo as race neutral"); Jones, supra note 7, at 2340 (criticizing,.for 
1 t.11 refusal to consider historical inequities, "relentless formalism" of view that affirmative 
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implemented plans and strategies to avoid liability in disparate 
impact cases, this theory is deemed the impetus for voluntary 
affirmative action plans, preferences, and quotas. 108 Indeed, in 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,109 after the Supreme Court 
announced that the disparate impact theory would be applied to 
subjective criteria as well as objective criteria used to make employ­
ment decisions, no a plurality of the Court quickly turned to the 
problem of quota fear. To assuage employers' putative belief that 
the extension of disparate impact would require implementation of 
quota hiring, the plurality diluted the "business-necessity" defense, 
styling it a "job-relatedness" defense, m and held that the burden 
of persuasion on the business-necessity defense remained with the 
plaintiff. 112 It has become increasingly fashionable in recent 
times to excoriate affirmative action plans and other attempts to 
eradicate the effects of past discrimination as, ironically, a type of 
discrimination. 113 The distaste for affirmative action and dispa-
action is itself discrimination). 108 Allen et al., supra note 102, at 199 (describing affirmative action as attempt to avoid 
liability for discrimination); Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 136-39 (describing relationship 
between disparate impact and affirmative action); Turner, supra note 7, at 447-48 (same). 109 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 110 Id. at 991. 111 Id. at 997-98. 112 Id. at 998. 113 In June 1995, the Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 
2097, 2117 ( 1995), held that federal affirmative action programs challenged on constitutional 
grounds must be evaluated under a strict-scrutiny standard, and thus must serve a 
compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored in order to be upheld. With 
Adarand, the Court extended its holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989), which applied the same standard to state and local programs. In the aftermath 
of Adarand, it seems that open season has been declared on affirmative action, and many 
politicians have shown up for the hunt. During June 1995, House and Senate oversight 
committees convened hearings to examine federal affirmative action plans. OFCCP Focus 
of House, Senate Hearings in June, DAILY LAB. REP., June 12, 1995, at A-18; Affirmative 
Action: Some Programs Will Fail Adarand Test, Patrick Tells House Oversight Panel, DAILY 
LAB. REP., July 21, 1995, at AA-1 to AA-2. On July 20, 1995, the regents of the University 
of California (including Governor Pete Wilson, then-presidential candidate for the Republican 
party) voted to abolish affirmative action in hiring, contracting, and admissions at the nine 
universities in the system. Affirmative Action: University of California Regents Ban 
Affirmative Action in Hiring, Admissions, DAILY LAB. REP., July 24, 1995, at A- 10 to A-1 1 . 
One week later, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, another candidate for the Republican 
nomination, and Representative Charles Canady introduced in the Senate and House, respec­
tively, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, a bill that would prohibit race and gender 
preferences in federal government programs. Affirmative Action: Dole, Canady Plan Early 
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rate impact is largely traceable to beliefs that efforts to eliminate 
discrimination should be rooted in colorblindness and equal 
opportunity, notions which tend to secure the status quo.114 
In view of the numerous objections to the disparate impact theory 
and its association with the anathemas affirmative action and 
quotas, it is not surprising that the Court, in its first major assault 
on employment discrimination law, used its employment-at-will 
weaponry to inflict the greatest damage on disparate impact.115 
What is surprising, however, is that the Court's second major as­
sault has targeted the disparate treatment theory, which embodies 
a generally accepted meaning of discrimination under the federal 
laws.116 Before moving to those battles, however, it is appropriate 
to consider what the relationship between employment at will and 
federal employment discrimination law should be. 
D. THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
Employment discrimination law must impinge on employment at 
will to some extent.117 An employer can no longer fire an employ­
ee (or take other adverse employment actions) for a good reason, a 
bad reason, or no reason at all without potentially incurring liabili­
ty.118 Nevertheless, while some bad reasons will result in liabili­
ty under employment discrimination law, those reasons are limited 
Hearings on Bill to Eliminate Preferences, DAILY LAB. REP., July 28, 1995, at A-1. 114 See, e.g. , Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 74-75 & n.427 ("[T]he full implications of 
disparate impact analysis appear to threaten the existing order, the regime of equal 
opportunity and its principal metaphor of colorblindness."). 115 See infra notes 150-159, 169-172 and accompanying text (discussing this assault). The 
Court's decisions exalting management prerogatives over federal employment discrimination 
law were not limited to disparate impact cases. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567 (1978), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), for example, addressed 
disparate treatment. It was in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), 
and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), however, that the Court ran 
roughshod over disparate impact, rendering it virtually useless until the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. 116 See supra note 103 (citing sources recognizing disparate treatment as most readily 
accepted form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII). 117 Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 71 ("The nearly absolute freedom that the employer 
once enjoyed is gone."). 118 Id. at 70. 
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to the discriminatory "because of' bases listed in the statutes. 119 
Thus, federal employment discrimination law "operate[s] against 
the presumed backdrop of at-will employment. "120 
Although discrimination law makes only a limited formal 
incursion on employment at will, it arguably does impinge more 
significantly in an informal way. Employers who are sued under 
a federal discrimination statute have their best chance of winning 
if they can offer a good reason for their adverse employment 
actions. 121 According to Professor Epstein, courts "will rightly be 
skeptical" of an employer's assertion that it did not discriminate if 
it offers no reason for its action, and in most cases, employers that 
offer bad, but nondiscriminatory, reasons will not be believed. 122 
This discussion of backdrops and slight incursions is only mildly 
helpful because it raises the question of how great an incursion the 
statutes should make. That question must be answered in a way 
that provides some useful guidance in determining the appropriate 
relationship in any given case. If the laws are to have any 
practical significance, they must displace employment at will to the 
extent necessary to effectuate the goals of the laws. 123 As dis­
cussed previously, the statutes' broad goal is to eliminate discrimi­
nation in employment, while the functional objectives are to deter 
discriminatory conduct and to make whole the victims of discrimi­
nation.124 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to displace 
employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate those 
objectives. 
119 "[E]mployers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good 
or bad, provided only that individuals may not be discriminated against because of race, 
religion, sex, or national origin." 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey 
during debate over Title VII). 
120 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); see also Kenneth G. Parker, Note, After­
Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 403, 430 (asserting Congress intended for Title VII to alter employment at will only 
"slightly"). 121 Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 70-71 ("[Title VII] creates caution where none was 
necessary before."). 122 EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 148 (emphasis added). 
123 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233 n.20 ("[T]he employment-at-will doctrine has been abridged 
only to the extent necessary to enforce the federal employment discrimination laws."). 124 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (identifying purposes of discrimination 
laws). 
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Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S SUBORDINATION OF FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
If the statutes are intended to protect employees, is it 
proper judicial performance to render, over and over, 
single-minded interpretations that favor employers and 
that predictably produce congressional reversal?125 
The Court's campaign to bury the employment discrimination 
laws and policies beneath the slab of employers' prerogatives can 
be divided into two stages: before and after the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. Furthermore, I consider three cases-Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters,126 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,121 and 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 128-to be the most 
important in this process. 129 In Furnco, the Court made it practi­
cally impossible for plaintiffs to win employment discrimination 
cases at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis-the 
employer's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.130 
In Hicks, the Court substantially weakened plaintiffs' chances of 
winning cases at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
126 William P. Murphy, Meandering Musings About Discrimination Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 
649, 654 (1994). 
128 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
127 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
128 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). 
129 I realize that all three of the cases are disparate treatment cases. Although several 
cases involving disparate impact have been very significant, these cases are more important 
in the Court's ongoing subordination for three reasons. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
attempts to overturn most of the Court's holdings that weakened the disparate impact 
theory, but Congress has yet to pass legislation to overturn these disparate treatment cases. 
Second, disparate treatment is the type of discrimination most clearly targeted in federal 
employment discrimination law, see supra note 103 (citing sources identifying primacy of 
disparate treatment discrimination). Thus, the Court's assault on that theory more blatantly 
flouts congressional intent. Third, some argue that the Court has treated disparate impact 
as a subset of disparate treatment. Compare George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under 
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987) (arguing 
disparate impact is extension of disparate treatment) with Allen et al., supra note 102, at 
177 (contending disparate treatment cases are subset of disparate impact cases) and with 
Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 
AM. U. L. REV. 799, 804-08 (1985) (positing that disparate treatment and disparate impact 
are based on different underlying theories). 
13° Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. 
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analysis-the plaintiffs proof that the employer's articulated reason 
is pretextual. 131 Finally, in McKennon, the Court targeted reme­
dies and established that even if a plaintiff proves discrimination 
in a disparate treatment case, he may recover very little if there is 
after-acquired evidence of his wrongdoing.132 
The practical effect of the Court's campaign is to make it difficult 
for plaintiffs to prevail and obtain adequate remedies in employ­
ment discrimination actions and, consequently, to discourage 
plaintiffs from suing. Thus, the subordination of employment 
discrimination law and policies to the employment-at-will doctrine 
takes place at two levels. First, within the cases, management 
prerogatives are being used to suppress the discrimination laws. 
Second, once the whole of discrimination law is weakened by the 
results in the individual cases, employment at will is left reigning 
over the landscape of employment relations because fewer victims 
of discrimination are willing to sue given their small chances of 
prevailing. 133 
A. INCIPIENT SUBORDINATION 
The Supreme Court's subordination of employment discrimina­
tion law and its policies to the employment-at-will doctrine can be 
traced to its Furnco opinion in 1978. 134 The Court began with the 
131 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
132 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886. 133 See, e.g. , infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text (discussing how this dual 
subordination operates in Hicks). 134 See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 71 (recognizing Furnco as Court's announcement 
of "its general disinclination to 'restructure' private business practices"). Professors Blumoff 
and Lewis point out that some earlier cases also evidence the Court's concern with balancing 
the policies of federal discrimination law against market forces. Id. (citing Franks v. 
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 ( 1976) and Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63 (1977)). Not until Furnco, however, did the Court admonish courts not to second-guess 
employers' business practices. Moreover, it is Furnco that is later quoted by courts in 
decisions balancing employers' rights against discrimination victims' rights. 
In a recent article, Professor D. Marvin Jones tracks the Court's "[s]ubmergence of 
[d]isparate [t]reatment in [s]ubjectivism," and the collapse of the disparate impact (effects) 
theory of discrimination. Jones, supra note 7, at 234 7-59. Professor Jones tracks those 
themes through several of the same pre-McKennon cases that I identify as indicative of the 
Court's subordination of employment discrimination law to employment at will. Professor 
Jones, noting the relationship between the subjectivist view of intent and the common-law 
rights of the employer, states, "A related premise here is that the employer's 'traditional 
1996] EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 333 
disparate treatment theory and then moved to the disparate impact 
theory. The subordination escalated until, in 1989, the Court 
"dismembered" the disparate impact theory.135 With employment 
discrimination law routed by the Court's onslaught, Congress inter­
vened in 1991 by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. But the war 
was not over. 
1. Furnco: Insulating the E mployer's Legi timate, Nondiscrimina­
tory Reason Against Judicial Second-Guessing. In Furnco, the 
plaintiffs were black bricklayers who had applied at the jobsite for 
employment. 136 The defendant's superintendent had not hired 
two of the three plaintiffs, 137 although they were fully qualified, 
because the hiring practice was to hire only persons "whom he 
knew to be experienced and competent" or persons who were 
recommended to him.138 The plaintiffs brought an action alleging 
racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The trial court had 
accepted as the employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 
that the company needed to hire people who had demonstrated 
prerogatives' survive Title VII-that, in effect, the statute's parameters are framed by 
common-law baselines." Id. at 2354. Indeed, the subjectivist view of intent is related to the 
Court's elevation of employment at will: Rather than closely examining an employer's stated 
reason for its actions, the Court defers to the common-law prerogatives of the employer and 
admonishes that courts should not second-guess employers because courts are not competent 
to perform such evaluations. E.g. , Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
Professor Deborah C. Malamud traces a different but related theme through the Supreme 
Court's decisions from McDonnell Douglas through Hicks in The Last Minuet: Di8parate 
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995). She views the decisions as insulating 
disparate treatment theory from the pro-plaintiff innovations in the Court's disparate impact 
decisions. Id. at 2263-66. I disagree with Professor Malamud's characterization of the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure as "rest[ing] on an essentially conservative foundation." 
Id. at 2266. Although she obviously is correct that many of the Court's decisions applying 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis have reached results favoring defendants, I think the proof 
structure developed in McDonnell Douglas was a pro-plaintiff innovation. Notwithstanding 
our disagreement on McDonnell Douglas, I think there is some kinship in the themes she 
and I trace in the post-McDonnell Douglas decisions. Malamud notes that earlier cases in 
the McDonnell Douglas line contain both "quotable passages explaining the need to eradicate 
discrimination . . . . [and] passages . . . that articulate a need to protect management 
prerogative against undue incursions." Id. at 2312-13 (footnote omitted). She, like I, also 
recognizes that this same "problem" exists in the Supreme Court's decisions involving the 
NLRA. Id. at 2313 n.268. 
136 BlumotT & Lewis, supra note 6, at 33-45. 
136 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 569. 
137 The third plaintiff was hired so late in the project that he had the opportunity to work 
only 20 days. Waters v. Fumco Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1977). 
138 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 570. 
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their competence to the superintendent and that evaluating 
. b h t• 139 qualifications at the gate of the works1te would e too c ao 1c. 
Rejecting that reason, the Seventh Circuit described a "middle 
ground" approach between hiring at the gate and hiring only from 
bricklayers known to the superintendent, 140 and ultimately held 
for the plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the court of appeals 
had misconceived the second part of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. 141 The Court explained that to satisfy the second part, 
the employer need only offer " 'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason.'  "142 The employer's practice need not be the best for 
hiring the maximum number of minority employees. 143 The Court 
explained that courts are not competent to restructure employers' 
business practices, "and unless mandated to do so by Congress they 
should not attempt it. "144 The underlying rationale for this 
"refinement" of the second part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
is quite clear: courts should not tread on employers' prerogatives 
in order to achieve the goals of Title VII. 145 Interestingly, the 
139 Waters, 551 F.2d at 1088. 
140 Id. The court's recommendation really was quite simple: take written applications 
that would indicate the qualifications of the applicant and then compare the qualifications 
of the applicant with those of persons on the superintendent's list. Id. at 1088-89. 
141 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578. 
142 Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1  U.S. 792, 802 ( 1978)). 
143 Id. at 577-78. Professor Jones challenges the Court's proclamation with the question, 
"Why not?" Jones, supra note 7, at 2350. Professor Jones then answers his question by 
explaining that the Court assumes that the discrimination prohibited by Title VII is a 
product of an employer's intent, and because Furnco exhibited no intent to exclude blacks 
in this case, no prohibited discrimination occurred. Id. I do not disagree with that answer. 
Tracking a different but related theme through the Court's decisions, however, I arrive at 
a different but closely related answer. 
144 Furnco, 436 U.S. at 578. 
145 See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 71 (citing Furnco in support of proposition that 
"common-law baselines have long informed" Court's Title VII jurisprudence); see also Culp, 
supra note 107, at 967 (citing passage from Furnco regarding courts' incompetence to restruc­
ture business practices as evidence that some federal judges believe Title VII cannot 
effectively eliminate discrimination because such law is unable to control market forces). 
An alternative explanation may be that, regardless of whether the law can control market 
forces, judges, operating from a baseline of employment at will, do not believe that the law 
should control market forces and employers' prerogatives. See Massey, supra note 46, at 
557-60 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on old property (based on traditional 
criteria of ownership) and new property (based on government entitlements) in context of 
employment at will). Then-Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Furnco. 
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Furnco admonition regarding judicial incompetence to second-guess 
employers parallels one of the theories explaining the widespread 
adoption of employment at will by state courts. Courts adopted the 
doctrine because they did not deem themselves competent to 
evaluate employers' discharge decisions.146 
The Court could have interpreted "legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason" as allowing an examination of the objective reasonableness 
of the reason articulated by the employer. Indeed, one would 
expect such an interpretation if the Court were more interested in 
effectuating the objectives of employment discrimination law than 
protecting employers' common-law prerogatives.147 Instead, the 
Court in Furnco balanced employers' prerogatives and federal em­
ployment discrimination law and struck a balance in favor of 
employers' prerogatives. This theme was to be repeated in 
subsequent decisions, becoming more slanted each time Furnco was 
invoked. 
The Court in Furnco also observed that, although it was decreas­
ing a plaintiffs chance of victory at the second stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff still could prevail at 
stage three by proving that the employer's legitimate, nondiscrimi­
natory reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.148 Fifteen 
years later, the Court would extrapolate the employer-prerogative 
theme of Furnco to render an interpretation of the pretext stage 
that virtually forecloses plaintiffs from winning cases at that stage 
of the analysis. This further frontal assault on the disparate 
treatment analysis would not come to fruition until 1993 in St. 
146 Morriss, supra note 35, at 762-63. 
147 See Jones, supra note 7, at 2349-50 (explaining that inquiry into reasonableness 
comports with role of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case-eliminating most-common 
nondiscriminatory explanations for acts-and with proper balance between policies of Title 
VII and legitimate business concerns). Professor Murphy reaches the following conclusion 
regarding the Court's construction of Title VII: 
At one time, it was an accepted canon of statutory construction (canonized by 
the Supreme Court) that remedial social legislation should be hospitably and 
generously construed to effectuate its purpose. Beginning in about 1976, this 
canon of construction was largely abandoned by the Supreme Court in 
discrimination law, and in subsequent years, culminating in 1989, the Court 
produced a series of decisions in which it rejected the view of law that favored 
employees and adopted a view that favored employers. 
Murphy, supra note 125, at 653. 
148 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578. 
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Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.149 In the meantime, the Court 
availed itself of several opportunities to subordinate discrimination 
victims' rights to employers' rights, most notably decimating the 
disparate impact theory and weakening the disparate treatment 
theory in mixed-motives cases. 
2. Extrapolating from Furnco: The Mantra of Judicial Incompe­
tence and Employers' Prerogatives. In 1988, a plurality of the Court 
incorporated the theme of supremacy of employers' prerogatives 
from Furnco into its decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust150 to weaken the disparate impact theory and lay the 
foundation for a more devastating attack in Wards Cove. In 
Watson, the plaintiff, a black woman who several times had been 
passed over for a promotion, brought an action under Title VII 
alleging race discrimination under disparate impact theory. The 
Court first held that disparate impact analysis is applicable not 
only to objective employment criteria, but also to subjective 
criteria. 151 However, a plurality of the Court then went on to sig­
nificantly reduce a plaintiffs chances of recovering under the 
disparate impact theory. First, the plurality announced that, as 
part of the prima facie case, a plaintiff must isolate the specific 
employment practice challenged and then establish a causal 
relationship between that practice and the exclusion of members of 
the protected group. 152 Next, it articulated a "watered-down" 
version of the employer's business-necessity defense, requiring only 
that the challenged practice be sufficiently related to a legitimate 
business purpose. 153 Finally, the plurality placed the burden of 
persuasion of that defense on the plaintiff. 154 
The plurality also suggested a change adverse to plaintiffs in the 
third stage of a disparate impact case, at which a plaintiff attempts 
to demonstrate that an alternative test or device would achieve the 
employer's objectives without the discriminatory effects. The 
plurality stated that cost and other burdens imposed by the 
149 1 13 S. Ct. 2742 ( 1993); see infra notes 1 88-237 and accompanying text (discussing 
Hicks). 
150 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
161 Id. at 991. 
152 Id. at 994 (plurality opinion). 
16.'I Id. at 999. 
1� Id. at 998. 
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proposed alternative are relevant in determining whether the 
alternative is "equally as effective as the challenged practice" in 
achieving the employer's legitimate goals.155 
Having altered the disparate impact case in these ways, the 
plurality conjured up Furnco and further diluted the business 
necessity defense by admonishing that, in determining whether 
subjective employment criteria are sufficiently related to legitimate 
business purposes, courts must bear in mind that they " 'are 
generally less competent than employers to restructure business 
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should 
not attempt it.' "156 The plurality acknowledged that plaintiffs 
would find it difficult to prevail under these "high standards of 
proof in disparate impact cases"157 and explained that such 
standards w�re necessary to prevent giving incentives to employers 
to "introduc[e] quotas or preferential treatment" as a method of 
avoiding liability.158 Thus, the plurality was careful to show that 
it would not interpret employment discrimination law in a manner 
favoring plaintiffs without imposing significant limitations on them, 
a position that in fact made the decision more of a defeat for 
plaintiffs. This theme was to be played out again in McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 159 
The following year, the Court fired salvos at both the disparate 
treatment theory and the disparate impact theory, rendering the 
latter virtually a dead letter. First, the Court attacked disparate 
treatment in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,160 in which yet another 
plurality of the Court honed its Furnco language and clearly stated 
its subordination of Title VII to employers' prerogatives. In Price 
Waterhouse, the Court encountered a Title VII plaintiff to whom 
the defendant accounting firm had denied a partnership promotion 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. Professor Culp describes the plurality's discussion as "turn[ing] Title VII on its 
head to protect white employers' ability to perpetuate procedures that freeze black workers 
out of the job market, while forestalling any success by the processes created by Title VII to 
encourage employers to take account of the number of black workers hired." Culp, supra 
note 107, at 1003. 
159 115 S. Ct. 879 ( 1995); see infra notes 273-396 and accompanying text (discussing 
McKennon). 160 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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based on both an illegal reason-her sex-and a legal reason-her 
lack of interpersonal skills.161 A plurality of the Court developed 
a framework for analyzing such "mixed-motives" disparate treat­
ment cases, that is, those in which the employer's adverse decision 
was motivated by both an illegitimate, discriminatory reason and 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.162 The plurality an­
nounced at the outset the policies that would drive its decision: 
"Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among 
employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice. 
This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives 
turns out to be decisive in the case before us. "163 The plurality 
concluded that when an employer considers both gender and 
legitimate factors in making a decision, it makes the decision 
"because of' sex within the meaning of Title VII's prohibition. 164 
The plurality then went on to hold that an employer, even if it had 
acted contrary to Title VII, could avoid imposition of liability by 
proving that it would have taken the same action in the absence of 
the discriminatory motive. 165 In announcing this "affirmative 
defense" to Title VII liability, the plurality reiterated its emphasis 
on employers' prerogatives: 
To say that an employer may not take gender into 
account is not, however, the end of the matter. . . . The 
other important aspect of the statute is its preservation 
of an employer's remaining freedom of choice. We 
conclude that the preservation of this freedom means 
that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, 
even if it had not taken gender into account, it would 
have come to the same decision regarding a particular 
person. The statute's maintenance of employer prerog­
atives is evident from the statute itself and from its 
history, both in Congress and in this Court.166 
161 Id. at 234-35. 
162 Id. at 240. 
163 Id. at 239 (emphasis added). 
164 Id. at 241. 
165 Id. at 242, 258. 
166 Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
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In his dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality's internal 
inconsistency in determining that an employer has made a decision 
"because of' sex and yet permitting the employer to avoid liability 
notwithstanding its violation of the statute.167 He pointed out 
that neither the language of Title VII nor its legislative history sup­
ported an affirmative defense based on employers' prerogatives. 168 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,169 also decided in 1989, is 
notable for the majority's adoption of the Watson plurality's 
disparate impact analysis. The Court clarified the Watson version 
of the employer's business "necessity" test as "whether a challenged 
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate goals of the 
employer."170 The Court also placed its imprimatur on the 
Watson plurality's adjustments of the plaintiffs demonstration of 
less discriminatory alternatives, holding that they must be as 
"equally effective" as the employer's chosen practice, and that cost 
and other burdens imposed by the alternatives are relevant in 
determining their effectiveness. 171 Of course, the Court again 
quoted from Furnco the mantra regarding courts' inferior compe­
tence in restructuring business practices.172 
3. Congress Strikes Back: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 . Price 
Waterhouse and Wards Cove were not the only decisions rendered 
by the Court in 1989 that were adverse to plaintiffs under federal 
employment discrimination law and its underlying policies.173 
167 Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 286; see also Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New 
Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495, 520 (1990) (asserting 
plurality stumbled by inventing "management prerogative exception" to Title VII liability in 
mixed-motives cases). 
169 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
110 Id. at 659. 
171 Id. at 661. 172 Id. The Wards Cove Court did demonstrate some originality, placing the seemingly 
required Furnco passage in the context of its discussion of the alternative practices. Id. The 
Watson Court, on the other hand, had invoked the words when warning courts about 
evaluating the sufficiency of the relationship between the employer's chosen practice and its 
legitimate goals. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 ( 1988}. 
173 See, e.g. , Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989) (limiting 
reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in employment discrimination actions by holding that § 1981 does 
not apply to conduct occurring after formation of contract); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
761 (1989) (holding white plaintiffs harmed by affirmative action plan in consent decree 
arising from separate action were not precluded from challenging plan); Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (holding statute of limitations applicable to dis-
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Indeed, employers won thirteen of fourteen employment law cases 
decided during the 1988-89 term. 174 Congress set about to stem 
the tide of the assault on discrimination law, passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990, 175 but President Bush, labelling the legislation 
a "quota bill," vetoed it. 176 During its next session, Congress 
reintroduced and passed the proposed legislation, and President 
Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.177 The Act had 
as one of its purposes overturning several of the Court's decisions, 
particularly from the 1988-89 term. 178 
Shortly after passage of the 1991 Act, Professor Culp, predicting 
Congress would soon need to reform the law again, noted, "Un­
doubtedly, these will be the Civil Rights Acts of 1998, 2005, and 
2010."179 He further predicted that, like the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, none of these chimerical laws would permanently resolve race 
problems in our society. 180 He premised this prediction on his 
belief that courts are unwilling to raise and address the "race 
question," which he formulates as, "How does race alter the 
crimination actions based on challenge to facially neutral seniority plan begins to run on 
plan's adoption date rather than date plan harms plaintiff); Independent Fed'n of Flight 
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (denying plaintiff class award of attorney's fees 
against union intervening in class action to challenge settlement agreement, where 
intervention not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). 
174 Murphy, supra note 125, at 654. Professor Murphy assesses the Court's treatment of 
the federal employment discrimination laws in definitive terms: "Not since the New Deal 
days has the Supreme Court given laws passed by Congress such hostile treatment." Id. 
175 Congress Approves Civil Rights Bill but Falls Short of Veto-Proof Majority, DAILY LAB. 
REP., Oct. 18, 1990, at A-4. 
178 136 CONG. REC. Sl6,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). 
177 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as 
amended principally in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)). Professor Culp notes 
that the 1991 Act, like its predecessor, appeared destined to be vetoed. Culp, supra note 107, 
at 965. Culp muses about the effect that the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas may 
have had on the President's decision to sign the bill. Id. 178 H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. Commentators have criticized the Act for various reasons. See, 
e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 2364 n.198 (criticizing Act's failure to overturn requirement in 
Wards Cove that plaintiffs identify specific practice causing discriminatory harm); Turner, 
supra note 7, at 456 & n.373 (noting commentators have criticized Act for returning law to 
inconsistent pre-Wards Cove case law without offering clarification). See generally 
Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RU'l'GERS L. REV. 
889 (1993) (discussing various aspects of Act). 
179 Culp, supra note 107, at 967. 
1so Id. 
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contours of legal reality?"181 Professor Culp was proven to be 
prophetic even sooner than he expected, as the Court decided Hicks 
in time for him to add a postscript to his article.182 
I agree with Culp: If federal employment discrimination law is 
to retain (or regain) a role as a body of law embodying and serving 
public policy rather than being reduced to just another basis for 
tort recovery, Congress will have to step in again and again. Will 
Congress ever be able to effect the "permanent" change that Culp 
deems impossible? I posit that such reform will not be possible 
until the Supreme Court stops subordinating federal employment 
discrimination law and its policies to the employment-at-will 
doctrine. In Hicks and McKennon, the Court announced in a 
stentorian voice that it is not about to do so. 
B. ESCALATING SUBORDINATION 
Not to be subdued by Congress,183 the Court took the offensive 
again in 1993, targeting the disparate treatment theory, with its 
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.184 Hicks reached a 
new level in the subordination of employment discrimination law, 
but it was soon to be surpassed by the Court's decision in McKen­
non v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.185 Hicks and McKennon 
each illustrate the Supreme C ourt's subordination of employment 
discrimination law to employment at will. That message becomes 
all the more apparent, however, when the two cases, which share 
some characteristics, are compared.186 
181 Id. at 966-67. 
182 Id. at 1007-10. 
183 Commenting on the Hicks decision following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Professor Culp stated: 
One might have thought that the conservative majority on this Court might 
have been chastened by Congress' actions in specifically rejecting several 
Supreme Court opinions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but it is clear . . .  that 
this Court will continue to force Congress to rewrite the Court's interpreta­
tion of Title VII law. 
Id. at 1010; see also Brookins, supra note 69, at 943 (observing Congress's enactment of 1991 
Act left Court "undaunted[,] . . .  because the Court is inherently more agile than Congress"). 
184 113 S. Ct. 2742 ( 1993). 
185 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). 
186 Two commentators, writing between the Court's decisions in Hicks and McKennon, 
suggested the importance of comparing the cases: 
[I]t will be interesting to see what approach the Court adopts [in McKennon], 
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1. Hicks: Eviscerating Plaintiffs' Opportunity to Pre vail at the 
Pretext Stage. 
You know I hate, detest, and can't bear a lie, not because 
I am straighter than the rest of us, but simply because it 
appal{l,]s me. There is a taint of death, a flavour of 
mortality in lies-which is exactly what I hate aT}-d detest 
in the world-what I want to forget. It makes me 
miserable and sick, like biting something rotten would 
do. 1s1 
a. The Decision and Analysis. In Hicks, the plaintiff was a 
correctional officer fired by the defendant halfway house after 
engaging in a heated exchange with his newly appointed supervi­
sor, in which he allegedly threatened the supervisor. 188 Hicks 
had an unremarkable employment record prior to the new supervis­
or's appointment, but thereafter he was disciplined several 
times-a suspension for five days b ased on his subordinates' rules 
violations; a letter of reprimand for failure to adequately investi­
gate a brawl between inmates; and a demotion from shift com­
mander to correctional officer for failing to have his subordinates 
log in use of an employer-owned vehicle189-before ultimately 
being discharged. 190 After his discharge, Hicks brought an action 
alleging discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII and 
section 1983. 191 
particularly in light of its decision in Hicks where the employer had created 
a pretext for the termination and the Court held that the employer's lying did 
not result in a verdict for the employee as a matter of law. 
Robert B. Fitzpatrick & Marlissa S. Briggett, Review of Significant U.S. Supre11U1 Court and 
Appellate Decisions, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1994). 
187 JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 27 (Robert Kimbrough ed., 1963). 
188 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993). 
189 Although the Supreme Court did not include these facts in its recitation, the trial court 
found that several white shift commanders had committed arguably more egregious 
violations than Hicks for which they had not been disciplined as harshly. Hicks v. St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Moreover, the trial court noted that 
Hicks's outburst occurred immediately after he was advised of his demotion and only after 
the supervisor had provoked him. Id. at 1251. Indeed, the court found that the supervisor 
"manufactured the confrontation between plaintiff and himself in order to terminate 
plaintiff." Id. 
190 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. 
191 42 u.s.c. § 1983 ( 1988). 
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The employer offered as the legitimate reasons for discharging 
Hicks his repeated and increasingly severe violations of the 
employer's rules.192 The district court concluded that the plaintiff 
had satisfied the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by 
proving his employer's articulated reasons were pretextual.193 
The plaintiffs proof of pretext consisted of evidence that, although 
his coworkers had committed rules violations at least as severe, 
they were disciplined less harshly.194 Nonetheless, the district 
court held that the plaintiff did not satisfy the ultimate burden of 
proving intentional discrimination. The court concluded that, 
although the reasons given by the employer were false, the plaintiff 
"ha[d] not proven that the crusade [to terminate him] was racially 
rather than personally motivated. "195 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff 
who proves pretext at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.196 In a five­
to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a finding 
of pretext does not mandate judgment for a plaintiff as a matter of 
law.191 
The opinions of the majority and the dissent are remarkably 
contentious. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, suggests in no 
uncertain terms that the dissent misunderstands the Court's 
precedent on this issue198 and finds absurd the dissent's charac­
terization as a "liar" an employer whose articulated reason is not 
believed.199 Justice Souter, writing the dissenting opinion, does 
indeed accuse the majority of abandoning the well-established 
McDonnell Douglas framework and its primary purpose200 and of 
adopting instead an analysis that favors lying employers over 
victims of discrimination. 201 
1 92 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. 
193 Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251. 
194 Id. at 1248, 1251. 
196 Id. at 1252. 
196 Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 
2742 (1993). 
197 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
198 Id. at 2750 ("Only one unfamiliar with our case-law will be upset by the dissent's 
alarum that we are today setting aside 'settled precedent[]' [and] . . .  'two decades of stable 
law in this Court[.]' "). 
199 Id. at 2754. 
200 Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
201 Id. at 2763, 2766. 
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Hicks is an important case in employment discrimination law 
because of its focus on defining a plaintiffs burden at the third 
stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Because plaintiffs 
usually can make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and 
because defendants usually can produce evidence of legitimate 
reasons for their actions, most disparate treatment cases analyzed 
under McDonnell Douglas are won or lost at the third stage of the 
analysis. 202 Dealing as it does with the most significant stage of 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Court in Hicks declares very 
bad law for plaintiffs under federal employment discrimination 
law.203 As bad as the holding of the case is for plaintiffs, the 
ambiguities of the decision have created even worse law in some 
lower court interpretations of Hicks. 
Prior to Hicks, the fleshing out of the third stage of the McDon­
nell Douglas analysis had taken shape in the lower courts as a 
battle between "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus. "204 The questions 
on which the courts focused were whether the third stage required 
a plaintiff to prove only that an employer's articulated reasons were 
pretextual or rather that the reasons were pretexts for discrimina­
tion (that is, both that the articulated reasons were false and that 
the true reason was discriminatory) and what types of evidence had 
202 Catherine Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff L<Jses: The Fallacy of the 
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 57, 67 (1991). 
203 Although the plaintiff in Hicks brought his claim under only Title VII, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interprets Hicks as applying equally to 
disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. EEOC: 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARy's HONOR CENTER v. HICKS, reprinted in DAILY LAB. 
REP., Apr. 13, 1994, at F -3 n.2. 
204 See, e.g. , Brookins, supra note 69, at 946 (detailing battle between circuits over use of 
pretext-only and pretext-plus); Lanctot, supra note 202, at 71 (citing inconsistency among 
federal circuits resulting from battle over pretext-only and pretext-plus); see also Anderson 
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing pretext-plus, 
pretext-only, and a version of pretext-only, and stating Court in Hicks adopted compromise 
approach of variation of pretext-only). 
Professor Malamud suggests a formulation that is perhaps more helpful than pretext­
only/pretext-plus because it describes the effects of the "combined evidence" of the plaintiff 
(from the first and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis). Malamud, supra note 
134, at 2306-07. Three positions are possible: "judgment for plaintiff always permitted"; 
"judgment for plaintiff sometimes permitted"; and "judgment for defendant required." Id. 
at 2306. 
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to be proffered to satisfy the burden.205 In Hicks, the Supreme 
Court chose the latter interpretation, holding that a plaintiff 
satisfies his burden at stage three by proving both that the 
employer's articulated reasons are pretextual and that the true 
reason is a prohibited discriminatory one. However, the Court in 
Hicks left unclear what evidence a plaintiff must proffer to prove 
that the true reason is discriminatory. 
Some commentators have interpreted the majority's opinion as 
adopting a "pure" pretext-plus approach, requiring a plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case, prove the employer's articulated 
reasons to be pretextual, and present additional direct evidence of 
discrimination.206 Indeed, the Hicks dissent reads the majority's 
approach as being susceptible of a pretext-plus interpretation.207 
Notwithstanding the arguably contradictory language in the 
majority's opinion, 208 the better interpretation of the decision is 
that the C ourt adopted a middle ground between pretext-only and 
205 See, e.g. , Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1 1 22-23 (detailing different approaches to pretext); 
Brookins, supra note 69, at 946 (same); Lanctot, supra note 202, at 65-66 (same); see also 
Julian R. Birnbaum, Some Recent Decisions and Current Issues in EEO Cases, in CONTEMPO­
RARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
47TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 445, 447-48 (Bruno Stein ed. , 1995) 
[hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES) (describing pretext-only approach as treating evidence 
of pretext as "bipolar," meaning that it serves two purposes). 206 E.g. , The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 348. 
207 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This 'pretext-plus' approach would 
tum Burdine on its head . . . .  "}. 
208 Early in the opinion the Court states: 
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant 
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will 
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination 
[and] . . .  "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required." 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. The foregoing passage suggests that the Court did not adopt a 
pure pretext-plus approach. Three pages later, however, the Court states the following: 
"Surely a more reasonable reading [of Burdine] is that proving the employer's reason false 
becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the 
real reason was intentional discrimination." Id. at 2752. This passage suggests that the 
Court did adopt a pure pretext-plus approach. See Jody H. Odell, Case Comment, Between 
Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and its 
Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1268-71 (1994) (discussing 
language in majority opinion supporting different interpretations}. 
346 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:305 
pretext-plus (labelled by one commentator as "pretext-maybe"209), 
holding that if a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and proves 
that the employer's articulated reason is false, the trier of fact may, 
although it is not required to as a matter of law, infer that the true 
reason was discriminatory.210 Although this approach still requires 
some "plus" evidence (that is, in addition to the proof of falsity), 
that requirement apparently can be satisfied by the prima facie and 
pretext evidence if such evidence provides a connection between the 
falsity and the alleged discrimination.211 
However, even if Hicks is interpreted as taking the middle­
ground approach, that interpretation provides little comfort for 
plaintiffs. In fact, the only positive aspect for plaintiffs is that the 
Court did not adopt the more disadvantageous pure pretext-plus 
approach. The middle-ground approach takes the sword out of the 
plaintiff's hand: once the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory 
reason, the trier of fact is not required, based upon proof of pretext, 
to conclude that discrimination occurred, 212 and thus, the plaintiff 
209 Michael J. Lambert, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks; The •Pretext-Maybe" 
Approach, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 163 (1994). 
210 EEOC: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARl"S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, supra note 
203, at F-2; see also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1 120, 1 123 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining Court rejected pretext-plus approach in favor of version of pretext-only earlier 
adopted by Seventh Circuit); Brookins, supra note 69, at 964-65 (noting ambiguous language 
in Hicks and concluding Court adopted approach between pretext-plus and pretext-only); 
Odell, supra note 208, at 1269-76, 1282 (discussing support for "permissive inference" 
interpretation of Hicks); cf Marcantel v. State Dep't ofTransp. & Dev., 3 7  F.3d 197, 200 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (asserting Court decided pretext alone is insufficient to satisfy burden at third 
stage of McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
211 See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by 
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina­
tion."); see also Brookins, supra note 69, at 964-65 (detailing extent of"plus" evidence needed 
to satisfy Hicks standard). But see Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 
1994) (labelling foregoing language in Hicks as "obvious[] dicta"), reh'g en bane granted, 49 
F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1995). 
212 See Calloway, supra note 85, at 1001 (asserting trier of fact is no longer required to 
find discrimination even if plaintiff proves pretext and presents additional evidence); cf 
Jones, supra note 7, at 2358 (arguing pretext evidence is interpreted as proving only that 
employer either lied or erred, and comparative evidence is "quintessentially equivocal"); The 
Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 349 (positing that without direct evidence 
and without presumption of discrimination based on proof of pretext, plaintiffs chances of 
winning depend on whether factfinder believes discrimination is prevalent in employment 
decisions). 
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has only a scintilla of a chance of winning at the third stage 
without a trial. 213 Even worse for plaintiffs, the ambiguities in 
Hicks have spawned even more deleterious progeny in the lower 
courts. 
Struggling with Hicks's evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs 
attempting to satisfy their burden at the third stage,214 some 
lower courts not only have taken the sword from plaintiffs, but also 
have allowed defendant employers to brandish the swords of 
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law more 
freely.215 Indeed, Justice Souter predicted this result in his 
dissent in Hicks because he was aware that the majority's opinion 
was susceptible of interpretation as adoption of a pure pretext-plus 
approach. 216 Thus, the notion of pretext-plus has crept back into 
some post-Hicks cases discussing the standard for summary 
judgment and judgment as a matter of law, with some courts 
requiring evidence in addition to that used to establish the prima 
facie case and to demonstrate pretext.217 
213 Brookins, supra note 69, at 957. 
214 This issue may be framed as determining the type and quantity of "plus evidence" 
required. Id. at 959. 
216 See generally Mark S. Dichter & Debra L. Casey, Summary Judgment in Employment 
Cases, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1 (P.L.l. Litig. & Admin. Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 522, 1995) (surveying post-Hicks summary judgment decisions); 
Zeldin, supra note 19, at 933-34. Both motions for summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter oflaw test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. See Lambert, supra note 209, at 
200-04 (giving examples of court decisions addressing plaintiffs' burden after Hicks); cf. 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2713.1, at 613 ( 1969) ("The directed 
verdict motion rests on the same theory as a Rule 56 motion . . . .  "). 
216 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This 'pretext-plus' approach . . .  
would result in summary judgment for the employer in the many cases where the plaintiff 
has no evidence beyond that required to prove a prima facie case and to show that the 
employer's articulated reasons are unworthy of credence."). 
217 This is what Professor Malamud labels the "judgment for defendant required" position. 
Malamud, supra note 134, at 2306. See, e.g. , Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 542 
(5th Cir. 1994) (concluding Court in Hicks rejected pretext-only and holding that plaintiff 
cannot avoid judgment as matter of law by establishing prima facie case and creating 
genuine issue of fact on pretext), reh'g en bane granted, 49 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g en 
bane, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1720 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit, in the 
rehearing en bane, decided that Hicks does not provide a categorical answer to when 
evidence establishing a prima facie case and pretext is sufficient to withstand a motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Rhodes, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1722. 
Rather, the court stated, such evidence may be sufficient in some cases and insufficient in 
others. Id. at 1722-23. Evaluating the case before it, the Fifth Circuit, overturning the 
panel's decision, held that the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for 
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has 
taken the position that the Court rejected the pretext-plus approach 
in Hicks and that establishment of a prima facie case and evidence 
of pretext is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judg­
ment. 218 Even courts that accept the foregoing interpretation of 
Hicks disagree whether sufficient evidence of pretext must be 
adduced in addition to that presented to make out the prima facie 
case, or whether the prima facie evidence can serve double duty 
and alone raise a genuine issue of material fact on pretext. 219 
JNOV. Id. at 1725. 
A federal district court applying the Fifth Circuit panel's interpretation of Hicks to 
consideration of a defendant's motion for summary judgment described the third stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis as two-pronged. Deaver v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 886 
F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The court concluded that although the plaintiff had 
established a genuine issue of material fact on the falsity of the defendant's reasons, she had 
not established a genuine issue regarding the "second prong of the third step"-proof that 
the discriminatory reasons were the real reasons. Id. The court acknowledged that the 
plaintiffs interpretation of Hicks was a "logical reading" of the case, but it explained that the 
Fifth Circuit in Rhodes declared the language on which plaintiff relied to be dicta. Id. at 583 
n.4. The district court further opined that "[t)he Fifth Circuit's interpretation [of Hicks] . . . 
makes it difficult for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment without compelling evidence 
evoking the defendant's discriminatory intent. This creates a truly formidable burden upon 
a plaintiff." Id. This burden should be ameliorated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in the 
rehearing en bane of Rhodes. 
218 EEOC: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARYS HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, supra note 
203, at F-3; see also EEOC v. IPMC, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 163, 164 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In its 
original decision in IPMC, the court construed Hicks as requiring a plaintiff in a Title VII 
or ADEA claim to establish both that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
a defendant's articulated reason for its adverse employment action is false and whether the 
true reason is discriminatory. EEOC v. IPMC, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 200, 205-06 (E.D. Mich. 
1993). In vacating its earlier decision, the court stated it had been convinced by the EEOC 
that it had read Hicks too broadly. The court then explained its new understanding of Hicks: 
Hicks, in the context of an age discrimination claim, stands for the propo­
sition that once a defendant articulates its justification for an employment ac­
tion, the trier of fact then must proceed to the ultimate question of whether 
plaintiff has proven that the defendant has intentionally discriminated 
against him because of his age. 
IPMC, 156 F.R.D. at 164. But see Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th Cir. 
1994) (rejecting proposition that prima facie case is sufficient to survive motion for summary 
judgment). 
219 Compare Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890-91 ("[W)hen evidence to refute the defendant's 
legitimate explanation is totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though 
plaintiff may have established a minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas 
type presumption." (emphasis in original)) with Bragalone v. Kona Coast Resort Joint 
Venture, 866 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Haw. 1994) (following Wallis but holding same direct 
evidence used to establish prima facie case may be considered in determining whether 
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Thus, divergent interpretations of Hicks and uncertainties regard­
ing the type of evidence necessary have placed plaintiffs asserting 
disparate treatment claims in jeopardy of having their cases struck 
down before trial or without resolution by the factfinder.220 
Viewed in isolation, Hicks looks bad enough for plaintiffs 
proceeding under the employment discrimination statutes. Viewed 
in light of the progression of cases which over the last two decades 
have eroded plaintiffs' rights under those laws, it looks worse. 
Hicks substantially surpasses Furnco in terms of making it difficult 
for plaintiffs to recover in disparate treatment cases. In 
Furnco,221 the Court eliminated the second stage of the McDon­
nell Douglas analysis as a point at which plaintiffs are likely to win 
treatment cases. Although the Furnco Court, by emphasizing that 
a plaintiff could still win by proving pretext,222 sought to temper 
the negative effect that its decision had on a plaintiffs chance of 
prevailing under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, fifteen years 
later in Hicks the Court further stripped the McDonnell Douglas 
framework of its viability as a means for plaintiffs to prove 
intentional discrimination. 223 
To say that Hicks was "wrongly" decided is perhaps an overstate­
ment if the decision is evaluated on the majority's terms. As the 
majority noted, lower courts had differed on resolution of the 
pretext-only versus pretext-plus issue.224 Although a majority of 
lower courts apparently followed the pretext-only approach,225 
plaintiff has raised triable issue of fact on pretext). 
220 See Brookins, supra note 69, at 957 ("Under the Hicks standard, a plaintiff who would 
have easily reached a fact-finder during the last twenty years will possibly become easy prey 
for an employer's motion for either summary judgment or directed verdict, even if the 
employer has virtually no defense for the adverse action." (footnote omitted)). A plaintiffs 
predicament is probably no greater in courts that followed the pretext-plus approach before 
Hicks. It will likely be greater, however, in courts that followed the pretext-only approach 
before Hicks. 221 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); see also supra notes 136-149 
and accompanying text (discussing Furnco). 
222 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578. 
223 Brookins, supra note 69, at 978-79 (explaining employers may escape summary 
judgment or directed verdicts on "the flimsiest of grounds" -facially legitimate reasons that 
need not be true). 
224 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. 2742, 2750 (1993); see also Lanctot, supra 
note 202, at 71-91 (discussing adoption of each approach among courts). 
226 Brookins, supra note 69, at 946; Lanctot, supra note 202, at 71-8 1 ;  The Supreme 
Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 342. 
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that fact hardly seems a basis on which to conclude the Supreme 
Court reached the wrong resolution of the issue. 226 In short, the 
Court in Hicks did no great violence to either prior case law221 or 
to Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (regarding the effect 
of presumptions), the latter which figured prominently in the 
majority's opinion. 228 However, the result in Hicks can be evalu­
ated in terms of the policies it promotes and the policies it subordi­
nates and, under those terms, the Court did not decide the case 
correctly. 229 
The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to assist 
plaintiffs in presenting circumstantial evidence of discrimina­
tion.230 Subjective intent is a difficult thing to prove,231 and 
without some objective employer manifestations acting as a proxy, 
226 For example, a majority of the federal courts of appeals adopted the Summers 
approach to after-acquired evidence, but the Supreme Court in McKennon rejected 
(somewhat) that approach as wrong. See infra notes 273-326 and accompanying text 
(discussing McKennon and pre-McKennon approaches to after-acquired evidence). 
227 The majority and dissent, of course, do interpret language in prior cases differently, 
but the split in the circuits indicates that this was not a new debate. 
228 Calloway, supra note 85, at 1002. But see Malamud, supra note 134, at 2262 & n.110 
(explaining that Rule 301 did not require result reached in Hicks). 
229 Professor Malamud disagrees. She argues that the Court correctly decided Hicks. 
Malamud, supra note 134, at 2237. She contends that the "nostalgic" critique of the 
McDonnell Douglas line of cases is flawed. Id. at 2232-37. That critique, she argues, fails 
to identify "an essentially conservative foundation" in the cases. Id. at 2266. Malamud sees 
in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, efforts by the Court to insulate the disparate 
treatment cases from the pro-plaintiff innovations in disparate impact cases. Id. at 2263-66. 
Accordingly, she does not find in the McDonnell Douglas line of cases a pro-plaintiff policy 
"needed to justify a mandatory pro-plaintiff presumption that is insufficiently supported by 
the weight of the evidence." Id. 
230 Brookins, supra note 69, at 980-81; cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 
( 1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard 
to come by."). 
231 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7 1 1, 716 ( 1983) 
(recognizing difficulty of determining employer's motivation, but emphasizing necessity of 
inquiry under Title Vil). The Court pulled a quote from antiquity to assure courts that the 
task is not impossible: 
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. 
It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at 
a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as 
anything else." 
Id. at 716-17 (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885) (Bowen, L.J.)); 
see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2351 (asserting subjective explanations escape scrutiny). 
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it is virtually impossible to prove.232 Moreover, an employer is in 
a better position than a plaintiff-employee to know and explain why 
the employer acted as it did.233 Thus, the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis was developed to provide that proxy.234 Courts were 
willing to make "the basic assumption" that, absent a credible 
explanation of a legitimate reason, adverse treatment of members 
of protected groups was more likely than not caused by intentional 
discrimination. 235 The decision to make that assumption was 
based on policy-the policy of federal employment discrimination 
law.236 In Hicks, a majority of the Court was no longer willing to 
make that assumption. In effect, the Court said the fact that an 
employer gives a pretextual reason for its actions does not necessar­
ily mean that it took those actions because of discriminatory 
intent.237 
b. The Triumph of Employment at Will, Again. Why would the 
Court adopt an interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
that is contrary to the policies of federal employment discrimination 
law? Why is a majority of the Court no longer willing to make the 
"basic assumption"? The Court itself obliquely provides that 
232 Consider, for example, the concept of intent in the context of intentional torts. It is 
hornbook law that the prima facie element of intent may be established either by showing 
that the tortfeasor had the purpose of causing the result or that the tortfeasor knew to a 
substantial certainty that her act would cause the result. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 33-34 (5th ed. 1984). Because the subjective 
purpose is difficult to prove absent an admission, the more objective alternative of 
"knowledge to a substantial certainty" serves as a proxy. 
233 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977). 
234 In evaluating Hicks, I am reminded of a pre-Hicks conversation I had with a colleague 
who teaches and writes in the area of corporate law. He had been reading about the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis and wanted to discuss it with me. When we discussed the 
pretext stage, I explained that the plaintitrs burden could be interpreted as either proving 
pretext or proving pretext for discrimination. He responded that "pretext for discrimination" 
could not be the proper interpretation because then the McDonnell Douglas analysis would 
mean nothing; it would not provide a proxy for intentional discrimination. My colleague was 
quite surprised when the Hicks decision was rendered. 
235 Calloway, supra note 85, at 997-98 (tracing this "basic assumption" to Court's 
explanation of why establishing prim a facie case raises rebut table presumption ofintentional 
discrimination). See generally Birnbaum, supra note 205, at 447 (explaining rationale for 
development of McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
236 Brookins, supra note 69, at 983-84. 
237 See Jones, supra note 7, at 2356 ("For the Court, the fact that the defendant is a liar 
does not mean that he is a bigot or a discriminator."). 
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answer in Hicks. One can see the iron fist of policies and objectives 
that the majority most highly values under the velvet glove238 of 
one statement: "We have no authority to impose liability upon an 
employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an 
appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, 
that the employer has unlawfully discriminated. "239 
On first reading, that statement seems to be an innocuous 
truism. Under closer scrutiny, however, one should question the 
function of that truism in the majority's opinion. The Court is 
saying that it is powerless to impose liability on employers, who 
have free reign to act under their prerogatives and the employ­
ment-at-will doctrine, unless they are found to have violated federal 
employment discrimination law. Of course, the very issue in the 
case is, when must the fact finder be required to find discrimination 
as a matter of law. 
Thus, the Court's circuitous statement is a poor attempt to justify 
its holding in Hicks as the correct and inevitable interpretation of 
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. In truth, the 
statement reveals that the Court chose not to exercise its power by 
requiring the fact finder to find discrimination when plaintiffs 
prove pretext, because the Court values employment at will more 
highly than employment discrimination law and its underlying 
policies. 
Although the majority did not explicitly articulate its subordina­
tion of employment discrimination law and its policies to the 
putatively uncontrollable force of employment at will, neither did 
it mask that subordination well. Indeed, the dissent exposed the 
majority's ordering of policies, discerning "no reason why Title VII 
interpretation should be driven by concern for employers who are 
too ashamed to be honest in court, at the expense of victims of 
238 The "fist inside the velvet glove" metaphor is borrowed from Justice Harlan's opinion 
in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). In that case, the Court used the 
metaphor to explain how an employer's announcement during a union organizing campaign 
that it would provide improved benefits could actually be a veiled threat in violation of § 8(aXl) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1988), because employees 
would understand that the source of the benefits also could withhold them in the future. Id. 
at 409. 
239 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 ( 1993). 
1996] EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 353 
discrimination who do not happen to have direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent. "240 
Several Hicks commentators have posited that although the 
treatment of presumptions and the standard for judgments as a 
matter of law would be unobjectionable in general civil litigation, 
they are inappropriate in an action involving legislation intended 
to implement social policies, such as those underlying discrimina­
tion law.241 Its protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
Court was not without power to adopt a pretext-only interpretation 
of the third stage of McDonnell Douglas. Instead, the Court's 
choice of an interpretation in Hicks was driven by policies and 
values other than those embodied in employment discrimination 
law.242 
The Supreme Court's meek admission of powerlessness to control 
employment at will, while patently incorrect, has a long lineage in 
the Court's employment discrimination decisions. The admission 
traces back to Furnco, in which the Court warned lower courts that 
they were competent neither to evaluate employers' business 
practices nor to suggest substitute practices that would be less 
discriminatory.243 In Hicks, the Court honed this language and 
articulated more clearly its powerlessness to prevent employment 
240 Id. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court's 
1992-1993 Term: A Review of Labor and Employment Law Cases, 9 LAB. LAW. 603, 625-26 
(1993) (attributing majority's and dissent's different interpretations of third stage of 
McDonnell Douglas to majority's focus on employment-at-will doctrine and dissent's focus on 
fairness). 24 1 E.g. , Brookins, supra note 69, at 953; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 
85, at 349, 351. 
242 Explaining why the Court attached a presumption of discrimination when a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Blumoff and Lewis state: 
Title Vll's very existence as a legislative statement of social policy demands 
this presumption. . . . Presumptions . . .  necessarily reflect normative 
decisions. In Title VII the prescription is to eliminate discrimination in the 
workplace, but that goal leaves open critical overriding and interrelated 
issues. What kinds of discrimination should be eliminated, how, and at what 
cost? That presumptions mirror social values does not mean that only 
normative considerations apply to our decisions to create presumptions. It 
does insist, however, that public values are a necessary component of that 
decision. 
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
243 See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco's admonition to 
courts not to second-guess employers). 
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at will from masking employment discrimination. This proclama­
tion of judicial weakness would become even stronger in McKen­
non.244 
The practical effect of Hicks is likely to be that victims of 
discrimination will sue less often, and those who do sue are more 
likely to settle for less or to lose their cases. 245 Thus, employment 
at will subordinates employment discrimination law at two levels. 
First, the policies of management prerogative prevail over employ­
ment discrimination policies in Hicks. Second, because of the effect 
of Hicks on potential plaintiffs, employers are able to operate 
almost as though employment discrimination law does not impinge 
on employment at will at all.246 Hicks was recognized as a 
significant defeat by supporters of employment discrimination law, 
and although several bills were introduced in Congress in 1993 to 
overturn the decision, 247 none passed. 
c. Treatment of "Liars" and the Coming of McKennon. 248 The 
majority and the dissent in Hicks engaged in a colloquy regarding 
whether employers whose reasons are determined to be pretextual 
are "liars," and whether that issue should affect the Court's 
interpretation of the third stage of McDonnell Douglas. The dissent 
244 See infra notes 273-326 and accompanying text (discussing McKennon). 
246 Culp, supra note 107, at 1010. 
246 See Jones, supra note 7, at 2358 (arguing that, because Hicks precludes comparative 
and pretext evidence as necessarily proving discrimination, Court has "close[d] the circle that 
defines a sphere of autonomy and sovereignty for the employer to decide whom to hire, fire, 
or promote"). 
�7 S. 1776, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3680, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 
2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1993); H.R. 2867, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The text ofH.R. 
2787 and H.R. 2867 is reproduced in Brookins, supra note 69, at 943 n.17. S. 1776 and H.R. 
3680 were companion bills introduced in the Senate by Senator Howard Metzenbaum and 
in the House by Representative Major Owens. Congress Moves to Overturn Hicks Ruling, 
DAILY LAB. REP., Dec. 9, 1993, at A-16. The Clinton Administration endorsed S. 1776, the 
Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, which the Justice Department characterized as "a 
carefully drafted, straightforward reversal of [Hicks]." Letter from Assistant Att'y Gen. 
Sheila F. Anthony to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy on S. 1776 (Sept. 13, 1 994), reprinted in 
DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 7, 1994, at E-1 to E-3. However, the bill did not make it out of 
committee. Malamud, supra note 134, at 2236 n.28. 248 [T)he Court frequently finds itself in areas whose full contours are revealed 
only as case law expands. Still, shadows from the unfolding landscape can 
be seen, and in dicta the Court indicates its anticipated course. Thus, by the 
time the foreseen issues actually reach the Court, the decisions are fairly 
predictable. 
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 73. 
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repeatedly referred to employers whose reasons are found to be 
pretextual as "liars"249 and denounced the majority for adopting 
an approach that rewards liars.250 
The majority rejected the dissent's labelling of all employers 
whose reasons are not believed as "liars"251 but conceded that 
some employers will be lying when they offer legitimate reasons for 
their employment decisions. 252 The majority expressed surprise, 
however, that the dissent would impose Title VII liability as 
punishment for an employer's lying because Title VII is not 
intended to punish perjury.253 Moreover, noted the majority, the 
dissent's "judgment-for-lying" scheme is not fair or symmetrical 
because, in part, "the plaintiff is permitted to lie about absolutely 
everything without losing a verdict he otherwise deserves. "254 
The majority's pronouncements provide a solid basis for comparing 
the Court's treatment of employment at will and employment 
discrimination law after its decision in McKennon, as that case 
addresses issues arising when employees are liars or malefactors. 
Interestingly, during the period between Hicks and McKennon, 
the Court decided a case under the National Labor Relations Act 
involving an employee who lied to his employer and to an adminis­
trative law judge. In ABF Freig h t  Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,255 the 
Court considered the remedy due an employee who had been 
discharged by his employer for filing an unfair labor practice charge 
against the employer and for participating in the grievances of 
other discharged employees. 256 The employee had lied to his 
employer about the reason he was late for work on the occasion 
leading to his termination and then repeated the lie in a hearing 
249 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2764 & nn.12-13 (1993) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
250 Id. at 2764 n.13 ("Under the majority's scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie, 
but succeeds in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its actions, will win its 
case and walk away rewarded for its falsehoods."). 
251 Id. at 2754 ("To say that [a) company which in good faith introduces such testimony 




254 Id. at 2755. 
255 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994). 
256 ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 585, 589, 591 (1991). The discharge violated 
§§ 8(aX1), (3) and (4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX1), (3) & (4) (1988). 
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before an administrative law judge.257 Having concluded that the 
employer discriminatorily discharged the employee in violation of 
the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board ordered the make­
whole relief of immediate reinstatement of the employee to his job 
with full backpay,258 and the Tenth Circuit enforced the Board's 
order.259 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following 
question: "Does an employee forfeit the remedy of reinstatement 
with backpay after the Administrative Law Judge finds that he 
purposefully testified falsely during the administrative hear­
ing?"2so 
The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, thus granting enforcement 
of the Board's order, but the Court's opinion and the concurring 
opinions suggested the Court was doing so based strictly on the 
deference due the Board as the NLRA's administering and inter­
preting agency.261 Although expressing concern over rewarding 
a plaintiffs perjury, the Court acknowledged that some of the 
employer's testimony also had been discredited by the adminis­
trative law judge. 262 Thus, the Court reasoned, it would not be 
fair to punish the employee for his lies by denying his remedies, as 
such a decision also would indirectly reward the employer's lack of 
candor.263 
The most notable aspect of ABF Freight, in the aftermath of 
Hicks and as a prelude to McKennon, is Justice Scalia's grudging 
concurrence. Justice Scalia, the author of the Hicks majority 
opinion, did not care for the lies of the employee at all, nor was he 
pleased by the Board's failure to deny, or at least to consider 
denying, backpay and reinstatement.264 Justice Scalia accused 
the Board of "an unseemly toleration of perjury."265 After a 
scathing attack on the Board's decision, in which he provided 
instruction on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, Justice 
257 ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 837. 
258 ABF Freight, 304 N.L.R.B. at 591. 
259 Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1992). 
260 ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 839 n.8. 261 Id. at 839-40, 842. 
262 Id. at 840. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
265 Id. at 841. 
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Scalia concluded, "I concur in the judgment of the Court that the 
NLRB did nothing against the law, and regret that it missed an 
opportunity to do something for the law."266 
One may be forgiven for asking why the author of the Hicks 
majority opinion would speak in favor of punishing lying employees 
by depriving them of their remedies when they have been discrimi­
nated against. After all, in Hicks Justice Scalia and the majority 
had been unwilling to equate an employer's presentation of a 
pretextual reason for its adverse employment action with a coverup 
for discriminatory motivation. In addition, Justice Scalia and the 
Hicks majority rejected the dissent's label of "liar" for an employer 
whose articulated reason was not believed by the factfinder.267 
Yet, in ABF Freight Justice Scalia asserted that the Court erred by 
comparing the "ABF managers' disbelieved testimony concerning 
motivations for firing and [the employee's] crystal-clear lie that he 
was where he was not."268 Justice Scalia's distinction, which 
would avoid inconsistency between his Hicks and ABF Freight 
opinions, raises an interesting point that goes back to Hicks. 
The difference between the "crystal-clear lie" and the "disbelieved 
testimony concerning motivations" is that the former deals with the 
state of objective facts, whereas the latter deals with subjective 
intent or motivation. A crystal-clear lie can be objectively dis­
proved, as it was in ABF Freight by a deputy sheriff who testified 
as to what he saw when he stopped the employee's car.269 Testi­
mony concerning motivations cannot be so easily disproved, 
however, because we cannot look into an employer's mind and 
capture the thought processes at the time an employment decision 
is made. This is precisely why circumstantial evidence is so 
important to plaintiffs and why many think that a plaintiffs 
demonstration of pretext at the third stage of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis should be sufficient to conclude as a matter of law 
that an employer's reasons were discriminatory. 
When, if ever, does the disbelieved testimony become a lie, or 
come close enough to a lie, so as to justify visiting adverse conse-
266 Id. at 843. 
267 See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing Hicks majority's denigration of 
dissent's characterization of lying employers as "absurd"). 
268 ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
:zGs Id. at 837 n.3. 
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quences on the employer proffering the disbelieved testimony? Is 
the heart of the difference really that, while both employees and 
employers lie, employers should not be punished for those lies 
connected to terminations and other adverse employment actions 
because employers can terminate for good reasons, bad reasons, or 
no reason at all?270 Some commentators predicted that ABF 
Freight provided some indication of how the Court would decide the 
after-acquired evidence issue before it in McKennon. 271 I think 
it did. 
2. McKennon: Gutting the Remedies. 
It's because he stays out there, right under the window, 
hammering and sawing on that . . .  box. Where she's got 
to see him. Where every breath she draws is full of his 
knocking and sawing where she can see him saying See. 
See what a good one I am making for you. I told him to 
go somewhere else. I said Good God do you want to see 
her in it. 272 
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. , 273 the unani­
mous Court finally purported to be doing something good for 
employment discrimination law by deciding the employer liability 
issue in after-acquired evidence cases in a way that favors the 
policies underlying that law. Upon closer examination of the 
Court's opinion, however, one discovers a different message in the 
Court's holding on the issue of limitations on liability: the Court 
continues creating a coffin for employment discrimination law and 
270 This is the very rationale some courts employ when denying an employee's claim for 
relief in a fraud-in-termination case. For example, in Stromberger v. 3M Co., 990 F.2d 974 
(7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff sued his former employer, claiming that the employer induced 
him to accept an early severance plan through fraudulent misrepresentations regarding its 
expectations of him if he remained in his job and regarding the outcome should he fail to 
meet those expectations. Id. at 976. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not 
establish the prima facie elements of fraud: the alleged misrepresentations caused no 
damage because, under the employment-at-will doctrine, the employer could have fired him 
for any reason or no reason. Id. at 977. 
271 E.g. , Charles S. Mishkind, The Use of "After-Acquired" KMwledge of Either Prehire 
Misrepresentations or Post-hire Misconduct in Employment Litigation and Arbitration., in. 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra note 205, at 3, 18-19. 
272 WILLIAM FAULKNER, As I LAY DYING 14 (Random House 1964) (1930). 
273 1 15 S. Ct. 879 ( 1995). 
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its policies. Construction has continued for many years, and now 
the coffin is almost complete. McKennon is, perhaps, the most 
definitive subordination of federal employment discrimination law 
to the employment-at-will doctrine to date. 
a. The Decision and Analysis. 
i. The Decision. In McKennon, the plaintiff was a 62 year­
old secretary who, after working for the defendant for almost forty 
years, was terminated in 1990, allegedly pursuant to a reduction in 
force. 274 McKennon filed an action alleging she was discharged 
because of her age in violation of the ADEA and the Tennessee 
Human Rights Act.275 During the plaintiffs deposition, the defen­
dant learned that while the plaintiff was still working as a 
secretary for the defendant, she had copied and removed from its 
office several confidential documents. 276 McKennon explained her 
actions as based on her concerns for job security: she copied the 
documents to give her "insurance" and "protection" against 
discharge. 277 Two days after the revelations in the deposition, the 
defendant sent McKennon a letter notifying her again of her 
termination, this time based on her actions regarding the docu­
ments, conduct which violated her job responsibilities.278 Fur­
thermore, the letter advised McKennon that had the defendant 
known of her actions, it would have terminated her immediately for 
that reason. 279 The defendant then filed a motion for summary 
judgment, supported by an affidavit from the company president in 
which he asserted that the Nashville Banner would have 
terminated McKennon at once had it learned of her actions before 
her (first) discharge occurred. 280 The district court granted the 
274 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn. 
1992), affd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), reu'd, 1 15 S.  Ct. 879 (1995). 
215 Id. 
276 Id. at 605-06. The documents were the following: a Nashville Banner Fiscal Period 
Payroll Ledger; a Nashville Banner Publishing Co., Inc., Profit and Loss Statement; an 
agreement between the Nashville Banner and one of its managing employees; and a few 
notes and memoranda. Id. 
277 Id. at 606. Ms. McKennon was concerned that she would be discharged because of her 
age, and she thought these documents regarding the employer's financial condition might 
help her. McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 883. 
278 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 883. 219 Id. 
280 McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 608. 
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motion under the rule, established in Summers v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 281 that "after-acquired" evi­
dence of misconduct that would have resulted in discharge of an 
employee precludes recovery by that employee in an action under 
employment discrimination statutes. 282 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, repeating the circuit's 
adherence to the Summers rule. 283 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs attempt to distinguish her case based on the connection 
between her misconduct and her discrimination claim, 284 instead 
holding that the only issue in an after-acquired evidence case is 
"whether the employer would have fired the plaintiff employee on 
the basis of the misconduct had it known of the misconduct."285 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in McKennon to resolve 
the split in the circuits on the after-acquired evidence issue it had 
attempted to resolve two years earlier.286 In a unanimous opin­
ion, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. First, the Court pro­
claimed the purpose of the ADEA and Title VII (" 'the elimination 
of discrimination in the workplace' ")287 and the objectives of 
these statutes (deterrence and compensation).288 Next, the Court 
acknowledged the role of private litigants in effecting these 
statutory objectives.289 Accordingly, the Court declared that to 
treat after-acquired evidence as precluding all relief would be 
inconsistent with this scheme of combatting discrimination.290 
281 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
282 Id. at 709. The Sixth Circuit had adopted the Summers rule in Johnson v. Honeywell 
Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992). 
283 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 1 15 
S. Ct. 879 (1995). 
2&1 The court understood McKennon's argument to be that because her misconduct was 
to prevent her employer from discriminating against her because of her age, the Summers 
rule should not apply. Id. at 543. 
285 Id. 
288 The Court had granted certiorari in a similar case in 1993, but the parties settled, and 
the case was dismissed. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 
1992), cert. granted, 1 13 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 1 14 S. Ct. 22 (1993). 
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The Court then turned its attention to Summers and explained 
that the Tenth Circuit's reliance in that case on Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle291 was misplaced 
because it ignored a significant difference between mixed-motives 
cases and after-acquired evidence cases: in mixed-motives cases, 
the employer actually knows of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for terminating the employee at the time it makes the 
decision, whereas in after-acquired evidence cases the employer 
learns of the legitimate reason only after it takes the action.292 
However, the Court had not finished its explication of after­
acquired evidence by overruling Summers. The Court next 
embarked u pon a discussion of how Title VII and the ADEA do not 
wholly supersede the legitimate prerogatives of employers.293 
Invoking language from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,294 in which 
it most forcefully insisted that management prerogatives must be 
balanced against the rights created by discrimination law,295 the 
Court focused on the legitimate rights of the employer that 
survived adoption of the employment discrimination statutes. The 
Court concluded that, in view of the balance between employers' 
prerogatives and the statutory rights of discrimination victims, 
after-acquired evidence may limit the remedies that a plaintiff can 
recover296 if the employer can "establish that the wrongdoing was 
291 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court considered the claim of a 
teacher for whom the school board based a refusal to rehire on both a legitimate reason and 
a reason that violated his constitutional free speech rights. The Court held that causation 
would be evaluated in two stages. First, if the plaintiff could prove that the protected 
conduct of the employee was a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" in the employer's 
decision, the burden of proof would shift to the employer. Id. at 287. Second, if the employer 
proves that it would have reached the same decision for a legitimate reason, relief would not 
necessarily be proper. Id. Thus, the court adopted a "but-for" causation test for liability in 
mixed-motives cases. 
292 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885. 
293 Id. at 886. 
294 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
295 See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision in Price 
Waterhouse). 
296 Regarding remedies, Title VII provides in part: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten­
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice . .  ., the court may 
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, 
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, 
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
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of such severity" that the employer would have terminated the 
employee for that reason alone, had it known of the wrongdoing at 
the time of discharge. 297 
First, the Court concluded that, "as a general rule," reinstate­
ment and front pay are not appropriate remedies, as ordering 
reinstatement would be "both inequitable and pointless. "298 
Second, the Court held that backpay may be reduced, reasoning 
that when an employer discovers evidence that would have resulted 
in discharge, the Court "cannot require the employer to ignore the 
information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in 
a suit against the employer and even if the information might have 
gone undiscovered absent the suit. "299 Thus, the Court adopted 
a "date-of-discovery" rule for reducing backpay. The Court left to 
lower courts the issue of whether other "extraordinary equitable 
circumstances" should be considered in determining the remedy in 
a particular case. 300 
Finally, the Court recognized that its holding might give employ­
ers an incentive to oppose discrimination claims by conducting 
extensive inquiries into employees' backgrounds and job perfor­
mances. 301 Labelling this a "not insubstantial" concern, 302 the 
back pay . . .  , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The ADEA, at issue in McKennon, provides 
for similar remedies. Because the ADEA incorporates the remedial provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, it additionally provides for liquidated damages for willful violations. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 ( 1991), amended 
Title VII and the ADA (and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) to make compensatory and 
punitive damages available under a disparate treatment theory if the plaintiff cannot recover 
such damages under § 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (Supp. V 1993). Compensatory 
damages are available for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." § 1981a(bX3). 
Punitive damages may be recovered if the plaintiff proves that the defendant "engaged in a 
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference 
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." § 198la(bX1). However, any 
compensatory and punitive damages award (excluding, of course, any such damages awarded 
under § 1981) will be capped, ranging from a low of $50,000 to a high of $300,000, depending 
on the number of employees employed by the defendant. § 198la(bX3). 
297 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 1 15 S. Ct. 879, 886 ( 1995). 298 Id. 
299 Id. (emphasis added). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 887. 
302 Id. 
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Court nevertheless disposed of the concern in summary fashion, 
opining that the authority of courts to award attorney's fees under 
the ADEA and the power to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "will deter most abuses. "303 
Prior to the Court's decision in McKennon, a majority of the 
federal circuit courts considering the after-acquired evidence issue 
followed the Summers rule. The Fourth,304 Sixth,305 
Eighth,306 and Tenth307 Circuits, and some panels of the Sev­
enth Circuit,308 followed the rule. The Third Circuit309 and 
some panels of the Seventh Circuit310 rejected the Summers rule's 
303 Jd. 
304 E.g. , Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614, 623-24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 832 (1984). Smallwood preceded Summers and was relied on by the Tenth Circuit in 
its Summers decision. One commentator considers it unclear whether the Fourth Circuit 
would have followed Summers. See Parker, supra note 120, at 404 n.4 (questioning Fourth 
Circuit's pre-Summers adherence to rule announced in that case and distinguishing 
Smallwood on ground that employer in Smallwood could easily prove it would have quickly 
discovered and acted upon after-acquired evidence ifit had processed plaintiff's application). 
However, two post-Summers district court decisions in the Fourth Circuit found the 
Summers approach to be consistent with Smallwood. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 
859 F. Supp. 963, 976 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Rich v. Westland Printers, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
1 42,856, at 78,730-31 (D. Md. 1993). 
306 E.g. , Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992), 
cert. granted, 1 13 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 1 14 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Johnson v. Honeywell 
Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992) (involving wrongful discharge claim rather 
than discrimination claim). 
306 E.g. , Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit's· 
adherence to Summers was qualified by its refusal in Welch to grant summary judgment in 
favor of the employer based solely on the employer's assertions in an affidavit that it would 
not have hired, and would have fired, the plaintiff had it known of the information. The 
court stated that an employer "bears a substantial burden of establishing that the policy pre­
dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and that the policy constitutes more 
than mere contract or employment application boilerplate." Id. at 1406. The court concluded 
that the employer's "self-serving" affidavit did not satisfy that heavy burden but did not 
decide that an unopposed employer affidavit could never satisfy the burden. Id. 
307 E.g. , Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Jackson v. Integra, Inc., Nos. 92-5143, 92-5153, 1994 WL 379305, at **2 (10th Cir. 1994). 
308 E.g. , Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Gilty v. 
Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding plaintitl's misrepresen­
tation of his academic credentials in seeking promotion precluded viable claim for disparate 
treatment or disparate impact); infra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing turbulent 
state of affairs in Seventh Circuit on after-acquired evidence issue). 
309 E.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. 
granted and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 ( 1995). 
310 E.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodserv. Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993). The 
Seventh Circuit panel reached its result in Kristufek without even citing Washington or Gilty, 
in which the circuit had held that after-acquired evidence of misrepresentation could bar 
recovery. To confuse matters further, neither Washington nor Gilty cited the Seventh 
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preclusion of all remedies, although both recognized that after­
acquired evidence may affect the remedies available to the plaintiff. 
In addition, an Eleventh Circuit panel had rejected the Summers 
rule in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co. ,311 and that decision 
became the battle standard of the many commentators decrying the 
remedy preclusion rule. However, before McKennon was decided, 
the Eleventh Circuit vacated its opinion and granted rehearing en 
bane in Wallace. 
Notwithstanding the support for the Summers rule in most 
federal appellate courts, the Supreme Court's rejection of the rule 
was predictable and the only reasonable decision. The Summers 
rule was overwhelmingly criticized by commentators.312 Most 
Circuit's earlier decision in Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989), 
which, while cognizant of Summers, refused to adopt its reasoning. See Mar<kll, 31 F.3d at 
1227-28 n. 11 (discussing Seventh Circuit's "bouncing back and forth between the two camps 
for a while"); Dale R. Crider, Dishonesty in the Employment Relationship ,  7 CHI. B. Ass'N 
REC. 16, 17 (Sept. 1993) (discussing Seventh Circuit's mysterious turnaround in Kristufek). 
The Eighth Circuit in Welch cited Washington for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit 
followed the majority approach of barring recovery in cases of after-acquired evidence. 
Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405. 311 968 F .2d 117 4, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding evidence of employee's application fraud, 
discovered after filing of suit, could not serve as legitimate cause for terminating employee 
and arguing that "Summers rule is antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII . . . . "), 
reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1 1th Cir. 1994). 312 See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 19, at 371 (criticizing Summers formulation); Ann C. 
McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evi<knce in 
Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 148-50 (1993) (arguing against Summers rule and 
pointing out that enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1991 made that approach to after-acquired 
evidence completely untenable); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct 
Discovered After an Employees' [sic] Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990) (noting "the unspoken evil of the after the fact defense is that 
some employers will be able to avoid total responsibility for their unlawful employment 
practices, such as employment discrimination"); Sprang, supra note 19, at 165 (decrying both 
remedy-preclusion approach of Summers and, to lesser extent, remedy-reduction approach 
adopted by Court in McKennon); Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role 
of After-Acquired Evi<knce in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 49, 54 
(1993) (criticizing approach to after-acquired evidence defense emerging in lower courts); 
Mills, supra note 19, at 1526 (arguing Summers "is unjust and inconsistent with the 
purposes of both Title VII and the ADEA"); Parker, supra note 120, at 404 (noting Summers 
approach to after-acquired evidence is problematic); Zemelman, supra note 20, at 211 (calling 
for "bar [on] the use of after-acquired evidence to immunize employers in discrimination 
cases"). But see William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evi<knce Doctrine in Title 
VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 
(11th Cir. 1992), 72 NEB. L. REV. 330, 332, 348 (1993) (noting wide support for Summers 
doctrine and need for "a system that keeps the essential element of the doctrine as 
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commentators and the federal appellate courts rejecting Summers 
pointed out that the Summers rule was based on an ill-conceived 
analogy to mixed-motives cases.313 In mixed-motives cases, the 
employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons 
at the time of its decision. In after-acquired evidence cases, 
however, the employer necessarily could only have been motivated 
by the illegitimate reason. This point was made clear in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins314 when the Supreme Court, extending the 
mixed-motives analysis of Mt. Healthy to Title VII cases, stated, 
"[a]n employer may not . . .  prevail in a mixed-motives case by 
offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that 
reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision. "315 
ii. Two Pre-McKennon Approaches to After-Acquired 
Evidence. Although a general consensus existed among commenta­
tors that the remedy preclusion rule of Summers should be rejected, 
there was little agreement on the effect after-acquired evidence 
should have on remedies. Unfortunately, prior to McKennon the 
EEOC took the position that the proper approach to after-acquired 
evidence permitted its use to cut off backpay from the date of 
discovery and to preclude reinstatement or front pay. The EEOC 
further allowed compensatory damages for the period prior to the 
date of discovery and punitive damages consistent with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.316 Under the EEOC's approach, if the date of 
discovery was unknown, a date would be approximated and a 
corresponding reduction made in backpay and compensatory 
damages.317 
The preclusion of reinstatement or front pay and the severance 
of backpay at the · date of discovery had substantial support among 
established in Summers"). 
313 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1229; Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180; see also supra note 312 (citing 
sources criticizing Summers). 
314 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
315 Id. at 252 (emphasis added). 
316 EEOC : REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISPARATE 
TREATMENT THEORY {1992) [hereinafter EEOC: REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE], reprinted 
in 405 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 6915, 6926-28 ( 1995); see also supra note 296 (discussing 1991 
Act's provision for compensatory and punitive damages). 
317 EEOC: REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, supra note 316, at 6926. 
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commentators. 318 Advocates of this approach opposed requiring 
post-discovery backpay and reinstatement for the same reason: 
awarding such remedies trammels the legitimate prerogatives of 
the employer. 319 While admitting that after-acquired evidence 
discovered pursuant to litigation was most troubling, Professors 
White and Brussack nevertheless argued that such evidence should 
cut off backpay from the date of discovery, reasoning, 
Anyone who contemplates bringing an employment 
discrimination action must weigh the risk that the 
defendant will uncover, in preparing for trial, informa­
tion about the plaintiff that triggers a discharge policy. 
There is nothing inherently illegitimate about an 
employer's acquisition of such information through 
pretrial discovery or through its own pretrial investiga­
tion.320 
Another approach receiving some support was that adopted by 
the Third Circuit in Mardell and the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace. 
Under that approach, backpay would be cut off before the date of 
judgment only if the employer could prove that it would have 
discovered the evidence independently of its discriminatory acts 
and the resulting litigation, and that it would have taken the same 
action against the employee at that time. 321 Although this ap­
proach also enjoyed support among some commentators, 322 even 
its advocates shied away, more or less, from requiring reinstate-
318 See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 19, at 399 (favoring date-of-discovery approach to limiting 
backpay and denying reinstatement); White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 80-91 (advocat­
ing severance of backpay from date of discovery and denial of reinstatement at remedial 
stage of trial if employer can establish that it would have terminated employee on basis of 
after-acquired evidence); Mills, supra note 19, at 1551-55 (advocating position of EEOC 
Guidelines). 
319 Davis, supra note 19, at 399; White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84; Mills, supra 
note 19, at 1552-53. 
320 White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84. 
321 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 3 1  F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted 
andjudgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 
1182 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 
1994). 
322 E.g. , McGinley, supra note 312, at 197; Sprang, supra note 19, at 157; Zemelman, 
supra note 20, at 207-11. 
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ment or front pay, based on the following rationale articulated by 
the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace : 
[A]ssuming that the after-acquired evidence in and of 
itself would have caused [the employer] to discharge 
[the plaintifl], it would be inappropriate for a court to 
order reinstatement or front pay . . . . In other words, 
if [the employer] now has a legitimate motive that 
would cause [the plaintiff's] discharge, then reinstate­
ment or front pay would go beyond making [the plain­
tifl] whole and would unduly trammel [the employer's] 
freedom to lawfully discharge employees.323 
Every commentator and court rejecting Summers while proposing 
limitations on employee remedies had one thing in common: they 
could not shake free of the grasp of employment at will so evident 
in the foregoing quotations from Professors White and Brus­
sack324 and from the Eleventh Circuit. 325 Proponents developed 
such treatments of after-acquired evidence in an effort to effect the 
compensation and deterrence objectives of federal employment 
discrimination law, but did so haltingly, ever fearful that they 
would trespass upon the forbidden territory of the employer's 
traditional prerogatives. The Eleventh Circuit's approach in 
Wallace was the most complete rejection of after-acquired evidence 
in an effort to remedy discrimination. Yet even that approach gave 
employers the opportunity to use after-acquired evidence to limit 
backpay, and it rejected altogether reinstatement and front pay as 
appropriate remedies. The proponents of the Wallace position 
should instead have advocated reinstatement as a proper remedy 
if an employer could not establish that it would have discovered the 
323 Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181-82; see also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240 ("[W)here an equitable 
remedy, such as reinstatement, would be particularly invasive of the employer's 'traditional 
management prerogatives,' the after-acquired evidence may bar that remedy."); McGinley, 
supra note 3 12, at 197 (stating even when employers cannot prove they would have 
discovered information independently, courts should refuse to reinstate employee); 
Zemelman, supra note 20, at 207 (concluding reasoning in Wallace is accurate and 
persuasive). 
324 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
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information independently. Moreover, as White and Brussack 
recognize, if reinstatement is not available, then neither should full 
backpay be available because the purpose of backpay is to make the 
plaintiff whole for the period between the adverse employment 
action and the time of reinstatement. 326 
iii. A Modest Proposal: Full Recovery. Prior to McKennon, 
I argued that neither the date-of-discovery approach nor the 
Wallace approach was the appropriate treatment of after-acquired 
evidence. 327 Instead, I argued, after-acquired evidence should be 
considered irrelevant and inadmissible in actions brought under 
federal employment discrimination law, with the sole exception 
being cases in which the employer could prove that reinstatement 
would create a substantial risk to its business, other employees, the 
plaintiff, or the public.328 However, the burden of proving this 
risk of harm should rest with the employer. I advocated this 
approach based on the principle that the objectives of the discrim­
ination statutes should be achieved and that the employer's 
prerogatives should be displaced to the extent necessary to achieve 
those objectives. 
Thus, my proposal would award full backpay and reinstatement 
under most circumstances. Are full backpay and reinstatement 
really necessary to accomplish the objectives of employment 
discrimination law? The Supreme Court fully addressed the 
importance of the backpay remedy in Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody.329 In Albemarle Paper Co. , the Court first explained that 
backpay deters discriminatory conduct by " 'provid[ing] the spur or 
catalyst which causes employers . . .  to self-examine and to self-
326 White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84; accord Mills, supra note 19, at 1552-53. 
327 This argument was included in my presentation before the Tenth Annual National 
Conference on Labor and Employment Law, identified supra note *. 
328 Cf Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 n.31 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing need for such exception at remedies stage of trial to avoid reinstatement if 
general rule existed that otherwise excluded "tainted" after-acquired evidence obtained 
through retaliatory investigations by employers), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 115 
S. Ct. 1397 (1995); McGinley, supra note 312, at 197 (stating courts should deny reinstate­
ment, even when employer cannot prove it would have discovered information independently, 
if employer proves reinstatement would cause it "serious harm"); Sprang, supra note 19, at 
156-57 (arguing against reinstatement when employer or public is exposed to possibility of 
substantial harm). 
329 422 U.S. 405 ( 1975). 
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evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, 
so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignomini­
ous page in this country's history.' "330 The Court explained that 
backpay is relevant to the compensation objective because, like all 
make-whole compensation, it attempts to put the plaintiff in the 
same position she would have been in but for the discriminatory 
conduct. 331 The Court then cautioned that a backpay award 
should not be denied unless the reasons for denial, "if applied 
generally," would not frustrate the dual objectives of the employ­
ment discrimination statutes. 332 
In light of the Court's conclusions on backpay, those who would 
allow after-acquired evidence to cut off that remedy prior to 
judgment bear the burden of demonstrating how doing so avoids 
frustrating the objectives of discrimination law. The date-of­
discovery proponents argued that allowing full backpay would 
overcompensate plaintiffs by placing them in a better position than 
they would have been absent the discrimination. 333 This proposi­
tion is wrong for several reasons. First, it fails to recognize that, 
in most cases, the employer would not have discovered the after­
acquired evidence absent its illegal acts and the ensuing litiga­
tion. 334 Moreover, the date-of-discovery approach does not require 
the employer to prove that it would have discovered the after­
acquired evidence independently. 
Second, the overcompensation argument assumes the only injury 
being redressed is the plaintiffs job loss (or similar results of the 
employer's adverse action). The argument fails to recognize the 
plaintiffs psychological injury from being treated as "less than 
330 Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N. L. Indus., 4 79 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
33 1 Id. at 418-21. 
332 Id. at 421. 
333 E.g. , White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 82; Mills, supra note 19, at 1547-48. 
334 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. gran�d 
and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995). The Third Circuit stated the following in 
Mardell: 
Id. 
Insofar as after-acquired evidence is uncovered during the legal dispute and 
would not have been discovered, at least for an indeterminate stretch of time, 
absent the employer's unlawful acts, the plaintiff would be left in a worse 
position because of the discrimination if the court were to make use of that 
evidence to limit the victim's remedies, and the make-whole compensatory 
goal of the acts would not be reached. 
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human"-being subjugated because of his race, color, sex, national­
ity, age, disability, or religion.335 
Third, the argument that full backpay might overcompensate a 
victim of discrimination is unduly emphasized by those who refuse 
to interfere with managerial prerogatives to achieve the goals of 
discrimination law. Compensation is neither the only objective of 
the employment discrimination statutes nor the most important. 
Even if a full backpay award resulted in overcompensation, that 
result would be more consistent with the broader goal of eradicat­
ing discrimination in the workplace. 336 
Finally, any approach that cuts off backpay before judgment 
would interfere with the deterrence objective of the statutes. Prior 
to McKennon, attorneys and consultants advising clients on the 
after-acquired evidence doctrine advised employers to take full 
advantage of the Summers remedy-preclusion approach by creating 
opportunities for employees to make misrepresentations on 
employment documents, by routinely searching for such misrepre­
sentations, and by establishing a low threshold for discharge.337 
This advice will not change now that after-acquired evidence can 
be used only to reduce significantly a plaintiffs remedies rather 
than to bar them altogether.338 
The rationales in favor of awarding full backpay also militate in 
335 Weber, supra note 168, at 534; see also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232 (describing 
"dehumanizing injury as real as, and often of far more severe and lasting harm than, a blow 
to the jaw"). 
Such injuries arguably will be compensated now that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides 
for compensatory damages, see supra note 296 (discussing compensatory damages provision 
of Act), and thus backpay need not be used in such a manner. Because the plaintiff's claim 
in McKennon was under the ADEA, under which compensatory and punitive damages were 
(and still are) unavailable, the Supreme Court did not address the effect of after-acquired 
evidence on such damages. In Enforcement Guidance issued after McKennon, the EEOC 
takes the position that only "out-of-pocket losses, analogous to backpay" should be cut off as 
of the date of discovery. EEOC: GUIDANCE ON AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE, reprinted in 405 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 7331, 7335 (Dec. 14, 1995). In contrast, compensatory damages for 
emotional harm should not be limited to the date of discovery. Id. at 7336. Furthermore, 
the EEOC takes the position that after-acquired evidence bars neither liquidated damages 
under the ADEA or the Equal Pay Act nor punitive damages. Id. at 7336-37. 
336 Weber, supra note 168, at 530-31. 
337 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236 n.26; see also Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Corp., 968 F.2d 1174, 
1180 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (explaining Summers rule "invites employers to establish ludicrously 
low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination and to devote fewer resources to preventing 
discrimination"), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 ( 1 1th Cir. 1994). 
338 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37, 1239; see also infra notes 378-395 and accompanying text 
(discussing issue further). 
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favor of awarding reinstatement. 339 Reinstatement as an employ­
ment discrimination remedy relates to both of the objectives of 
employment discrimination law.340 To award something less or 
something different is to undercompensate and underdeter. 
Commentators on the subject of make-whole relief have identified 
several important consequences of denying reinstatement. 341 
First, employees who are dismissed for discriminatory reasons are 
stigmatized by their dismissals and are likely to take longer 
obtaining other jobs than are employees who are laid off for 
economic reasons.342 Thus, even if front pay is provided in lieu 
of reinstatement, that award is not necessarily an adequate 
substitute for the plaintiffs former job.343 Second, if employees 
discharged for discriminatory reasons cannot be reinstated, 
employers will understand that they can discriminate and rid 
themselves of unwanted employees for a relatively low price. Thus, 
the deterrent impact of discrimination lawsuits is significantly 
decreased. 344 Finally, if victims of discrimination are not rein­
stated, the message to other employees becomes clear: they can 
lose their jobs, too, notwithstanding their federally protected rights, 
and they must be careful about asserting these rights.345 Thus, 
the number of "private attorneys general" decreases and, as a 
result, the deterrent effect of federal employment discrimination 
law diminishes. 
339 Corbett, supra note *, at 215-18; see also Parker, supra note 120, at 436.37 (explaining 
that Eleventh Circuit in Wallace failed to recognize that denying reinstatement or front pay 
would leave plaintiffs in worse position than they would have been absent discrimination, 
despite recognizing this point regarding backpay). Even date-of-discovery proponents used 
this point to criticize supporters of the Wallace approach, asserting they failed to remain 
consistent with the underlying premise of their argument for full backpay. See, e.g. , Mills, 
supra note 19, at 1548 ("[l]f cutting off back pay at the point of discovery grants a windfall 
to employers, why was it not a windfall to the employer in Wallace to avoid front pay, 
reinstatement, and injunctive relief based upon the after-acquired evidence?"). 
340 Weber, supra note 168, at 530-32. 
341 Benjamin W. Wolk.inson & Victor W. Nichol, The Illusion of Make-Whole Relief: The 
Exclusion of the Reinstatement Remedy in Hostility-Based Discrimination Cases, 8 LAB. LAW. 
157, 168-71 (1992). 
342 Id. at 169. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at 170. 
345 Id. at 171 ("Reinstatement is not only a remedy for the particular employee 
discharged, but is also an attempt to lessen the effects of the discharge on the remaining 
employees."). 
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While arguing that reinstatement should not be generally 
prohibited in after-acquired evidence cases, I recognize that 
reinstatement does not always accomplish the objective of returning 
a plaintiff to long-term employment with the same employer. 
Empirical evaluations of reinstatement under the National Labor 
Relations Act indicate that most plaintiffs offered reinstatement 
refuse to return, and most of those who accept reinstatement 
remain on the job for less than two years.346 That fact notwith­
standing, reinstatement is an important remedy that should not be 
barred. It may be that most discrimination victims holding 
judgments entitling them to reinstatement would settle with 
employers by "trading in" their reinstatement right for more 
money.347 Even so, the choice rightly remains in the hands of the 
victim. In litigating employment discrimination cases, I encoun­
tered cases in which the plaintiffs would not trade reinstatement 
for money because they needed the job. Moreover, I also encoun­
tered employers who were far more upset by being required to 
reinstate a discrimination victim than by any monetary award. 
The attitude of such employers-that they should be entitled to 
discriminate for a price-is the very reason why reinstatement is 
an irreplaceable remedy for violations of federal employment 
discrimination law. In the words of the Court in Albemarle Paper 
Co. , such employers need to see the reinstated employee back on 
the job to spur them " 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their 
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as 
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page 
in this country's history.' "348 
My proposal for treating after-acquired evidence is like that of 
Professor Mark Weber, who proposed that courts should award full 
348 Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. 
L. REV. l, 28-32. Although Professor West concludes that reinstatement is not an effective 
make-whole remedy, she recognizes two unique advantages of the remedy. First, even if the 
reinstated employee remains on the job for only a short time, the reinstatement itself may 
remove the stigma of discharge, thus making it easier for the employee to find another job. 
Second, no matter how long it lasts, reinstatement sends a message to the employer that it 
did not "get away with" discrimination. Id. at 40. 
347 Weber, supra note 168, at 537 n.319. 
348 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting United States v. N. 
L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
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recovery to plaintiffs in mixed-motives cases.349 Weber argued 
that such relief is appropriate because it "advances the remedial 
goals of compensation, deterrence, and vindication of the communi­
ty sense of justice, and satisfies the terms and policies of Title 
VII. "350 Moreover, he argued, alternative approaches to remedies 
in mixed-motives cases permit "management prerogatives [to] 
trump the civil rights of minorities and women. "351 
In opposing such an approach to after-acquired evidence, 
Professors White and Brussack point out that Congress rejected 
Weber's full-recovery approach to mixed-motives cases in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.352 In response to White and Brussack, two 
points are in order. First, Congress's rejection of Weber's approach 
does not mean that it is not the better approach. Second, as both 
McKennon and White and Brussack's article recognize, after­
acquired evidence cases are not analogous to mixed-motives cases: 
the established discriminatory act based on discriminatory motive 
alone in after-acquired evidence cases makes the argument for full 
relief stronger in such cases than in mixed-motives cases. 
For all my protestations that after-acquired evidence should not 
affect either liability or remedies, the Supreme Court in McKennon 
adopted the date-of-discovery treatment. Short of adopting 
Summers's remedy preclusion rule, a result that would have been 
astounding even for a Court undervaluing employment discrimina­
tion law, the Court could not have adopted a more pro-employer 
approach than date-of-discovery. Thus, the McKennon decision is 
a resounding subordination of employment discrimination law to 
employment at will. 
b. Same Old Story: Employment at Will Wins. The fall of 
Summers is much exaggerated. Although the Court rejected the 
preclusion of remedies based on after-acquired evidence, it nonethe-
349 Weber, supra note 168, at 538. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at 539. 
352 White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 82. In the 1991 Act, Congress provided that in 
mixed-motives cases in which employers would have taken the same adverse employment 
action absent the discriminatory motive, courts may grant declaratory relief, some injunctive 
relief, and attorney's fees and costs, but they are prohibited from awarding damages or 
ordering reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or other payment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2)(B) 
(Supp. V 1993). 
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less adopted an approach that will result in victims of discrimina­
tion recovering very little. The dissent in Wallace thought it 
strange that the majority rejected Summers as an "affirmative 
defense," but then accepted it as a limitation on relief.363 Indeed, 
what the Supreme Court did in McKennon was kick Summers out 
the front door in the first part of the opinion and then, in the 
second part of the opinion, let it in the back door.364 
It would be difficult to find a Supreme Court opinion that more 
concisely and cogently states the purposes of federal employment 
discrimination law than the first part of the McKennon analy­
sis. 355 After stating the law's overall goal of eradicating discrimi­
nation and its dual objectives of deterrence and compensation, the 
Court declared the important role of private litigants in furthering 
these objectives. 356 Indeed, the Court recognized that the "effica­
cy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the 
success of the [ADEAJ. "357 With that prelude, the Court rejected 
Summers. 358 
Despite having extolled the virtues of discrimination law in the 
first part of its analysis, the Court then elevated employment at 
will above that law in the second part. One would have to go back 
to Price Waterhouse359 to find a more explicit statement that, in 
the balance between discrimination victims' statutory rights and 
employers' common-law prerogatives, employers' rights win. The 
second part of the opinion is chock-full of the minions of employ­
ment at will: "legitimate interests of the employer," "employer's 
legitimate concerns," "significant other prerogatives and discretions 
in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their 
employees," "employers' freedom of choice," "lawful prerogatives of 
353 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Corp., 968 F.2d 1 174, 1 188 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J., 
dissenting), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994). 
354 Similarly, the Court explained that the unclean hands defense does not apply to bar 
recovery where, as in employment discrimination actions, important public policies are 
served by the lawsuit. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 1 1 5  S. Ct. 879, 885 
(1995). However, the Court immediately discussed allowing the plaintiffs wrongful act to 
reduce the remedy available. Id. at 886. 
355 Id. at 884-85. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. at 885. 
356 Id. 
359 See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse). 
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the employer," and "employer's rights and prerogatives."360 The 
Court, implicitly explaining the wide ambit it is recognizing for 
employment at will, explained that the ADEA and Title VII are not 
a "general regulation of the workplace. "361 
After utilizing employer prerogatives to rout the discrimination 
statutes, the Court adopted the date-of-discovery approach to after­
acquired evidence, proclaiming that "we cannot require the 
employer to ignore the information even if it is acquired during the 
course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the 
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit."362 
The Court has done this before-declared that it is powerless to 
prevent the subordination of the employment discrimination 
statutes to employment at will. 363 The question remains the 
same as it was in response to the Court's declarations of incompe­
tence and impotence in Furnco and Hicks: Is the correct language 
"cannot" or "will not"? 
Theoretically, the McKennon Court's elevation of employment at 
will over discrimination law is perhaps more troubling than in any 
of the prior cases. At least in Furnco, Hicks, and the others, the 
Court exalted employers' prerogatives when the plaintiffs had not 
proven discrimination (although I realize the Court used the 
employers' prerogative principles to conclude that the plaintiffs had 
not proven discrimination). In McKennon, the employer, for the 
purposes of its motion for summary judgment based on after­
acquired evidence, conceded that it had discriminated.364 Thus, 
McKennon differed from its predecessors in that no issue existed as 
to whether the employer discriminated in violation of federal law. 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the 
admitted violation of the employment discrimination laws, it must 
conduct a balancing of the victim's statutory rights with the 
employer's rights in order to avoid trammeling the employer's 
rights.365 
360 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 886. Note that all of this language fits into one page in the 
reporter. 
as1 Id. 
362 Id. (emphasis added). 
363 See supra notes 141-146, 243-244 and accompanying text (discussing Court's general 
reluctance in Furnco and Hicks, respectively, to put limits on employment at will). 
36'1 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883. 
365 Id. at 886. 
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One might think that when there is an admitted statutory 
violation, the Court would be more concerned with giving effect to 
the objectives of the statutes and less concerned with trespassing 
upon the sacred ground of employers' common-law rights. Employ­
ment at will triumphs, however, even when discriminatory 
violations are admitted. The Court rushed to preserve the employ­
er's rights before ensuring that an admitted violation of employ­
ment discrimination law was effectively remedied. 
Moreover, McKennon is worse than many of the Court's prior 
decisions because it was a unanimous opinion. Hicks, in contrast, 
was a five-four decision. It is troubling that not one justice 
expressed a dissent concerning the limitation the Court was 
imposing on a plaintiffs remedies. 366 
McKennon also presents an interesting contrast to Hicks. In 
Hicks, the majority and dissent disagreed about whether a 
defendant employer whose articulated reasons for its adverse 
actions are found to be pretextual is a liar, and if so, whether that 
should result in judgment for the plaintiff.367 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, rejected the idea that such an employer is 
necessarily a liar. Even if one concludes the employer is a liar, the 
majority argued, Title VII is not a statute designed to punish 
perjury.368 As the Court suggested, employment at will renders 
the Court powerless to impose liability on lying employers. 369 
Moreover, the Hicks majority contended that the dissent's 
judgment-for-lying scheme was not symmetrical because plaintiffs 
could lie about everything without jeopardizing a judgment to 
which they were otherwise entitled. 370 Yet, in after-acquired 
evidence cases, where the lying or dishonest party is the employ-
366 See Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 291 ("It is surprising that this view was 
adopted without a single dissent, since there were compelling arguments against this 
position as well as forebodings of abuse."). 
367 See supra notes 249-254 and accompanying text (discussing majority and dissenting 
opinions in Hicks concerning lying employers). 
368 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993) . 
• 369 See s�p�a_ note 239 and accompanying text (discussing Court's unwillingness in Hicks 
to impose hab1lity based on employer's prevarication). 
370 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. 
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ee,371 the Court unanimously responds by imposing a substantial 
limitation on the available remedies. If symmetrical treatment 
were still important, as the majority suggested in Hicks, the 
plaintiff should not be punished for dishonesty in the context of her 
employment discrimination action. 
Moreover, the dishonesty in after-acquired evidence cases is not 
perjury in a court of law or in an administrative proceeding, for 
which the Court expressed such disdain in ABF Freight.312 In 
sum, given the Hicks Court's tolerance of "liars," who were shielded 
from the imposition of liability by employment at will, one would 
have thought that dishonest employees would have been given 
greater protection by the employment discrimination laws and 
policies to prevent a ravaging of their remedies. The difference 
may be that the Court values employment at will enough to 
tolerate dishonest employers, but does not value the discrimination 
laws enough to tolerate dishonest employees. 
A final point of concern regarding McKennon is the increasing 
privatization of employment discrimination law. A pre-McKennon 
commentator explained that the evolution among judges, legisla­
tors, and others in their views on the purpose of Title VII, from a 
statute addressing important public policy concerns to a statute 
providing remedies for personal injury claims between private 
parties,373 made the Summers rule a palatable approach to after­
acquired evidence.374 The Court's opinion in McKennon demon­
strates this changing view. The Court discussed the unclean hands 
defense and said that it had formerly rejected application of that 
371 Indeed, the most common after-acquired evidence cases are those involving lies, such 
as resume or application fraud. See infra notes 378-379 and accompanying text (noting 
common occurrence of "puffing" in job applications). Even cases, such as McKennon, that 
involve wrongful conduct other than misrepresentations, still involve dishonesty. 
372 See supra notes 255-271 and accompanying text (discussing ABF Freight fully). 
373 At least one reason for this evolution is that the vast majority of employment 
discrimination actions now involve discharges. Prior to 1977, more actions involved refusals 
to hire. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1016 fig.7. Furthermore, the shift has been 
dramatic: whereas failure-to-hire EEOC charges outnumbered unlawful termination charges 
by 50% in 1966, unlawful discharge claims outnumbered failure-to-hire claims by more than 
600% in 1985. Id. at 1015. Thus, many have come to believe that discrimination actions no 
longer serve the original purpose of opening job markets to discrimination victims who had 
been excluded. Id. at 1033. Instead, the discrimination laws have become statutory 
wrongful discharge laws. Id. 
374 Zemelman, supra note 20, at 193-97. 
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defense " 'where a private suit serves important public purpos­
es.' "375 Then, in the next sentence, the Court stated that the 
foregoing proposition does not mean that the employee's misconduct 
is irrelevant to the remedies available. 376 
The Court seems to be saying that it thinks there is nothing 
wrong with deemphasizing the compensation objective (which is 
directed more toward private purposes) when the plaintiff has 
engaged in wrongful conduct. What the Court fails to recognize or 
address, however, is the substantial effect that such a limitation 
also has on the deterrence obj ective377 (which is directed more 
toward the public policies of the law). The Court's decision in 
McKennon is not only a product of a belief that employment 
discrimination law provides relief in essentially private disputes, 
but it is also a portent of the continuing, and perhaps escalating, 
privatization of discrimination law. The Court's willingness to 
allow after-acquired evidence to strip away most of the plaintiffs 
equitable remedies projects its view that employment discrimina­
tion law is like any other private law. Bereft of its public policy 
banner, employment discrimination law becomes little more than 
a statutory-tort exception to employment at will. As such, it 
probably will become even more susceptible to employment at will's 
onslaught. 
A more serious concern than the theoretical one discussed above 
is that McKennon makes circumvention of federal employment 
discrimination law both possible and advisable on the practical 
level of day-to-day business operations. After-acquired evidence 
cases are not rare cases. Although McKennon involved post-hiring 
wrongful employee conduct, most after-acquired evidence cases 
involve resume or application fraud, in which applicants for jobs 
engage in "puffing" of education credentials or work experience to 
enhance their chances of employment.378 Such conduct is wide-
375 M�Kennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 ( 1995) (quoting 
Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)). 
376 Id. at 886. 
377 s 
. fr . ee in a notes 378·388 and accompanymg text (highlighting undermining effect of 
McKennon on deterrence objective of discrimination laws). 
378 White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 53 & n.13. 
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spread. 379 While the prevalence of such conduct does not excuse 
it, the effect it has on discrimination claims will produce a signifi­
cant impact on the overall enforcement of employment discrimina­
tion law. 380 
The Third Circuit in Mardell reviewed the advice given to 
employers seeking to take advantage of the Summers approach to 
after-acquired evidence. 381 Among that advice: (1) Include on 
applications and other employment documents an express state­
ment that misrepresentations can result in discharge; (2) When an 
employee or former employee sues for employment discrimination, 
immediately conduct a thorough investigation to determine whether 
there are misrepresentations or other misconduct that can be used 
in defense of the suit; and (3) Routinely search for pre-employment 
misrepresentations.382 One commentator added that employers 
should uniformly apply their policies and, during pre-trial discov­
ery, should depose the plaintiff about his application and other 
personnel documents "line-by-line" to uncover any misrepresenta­
tions.383 
Predictably, given the prevalence of misrepresentations, such 
exploitation of after-acquired evidence will result in underenforce­
ment of the discrimination laws and thereby underdeter discrimina­
tion in employment practices.384 Not enough blameless employees 
exist to serve the role of "private attorneys general." The Third 
Circuit predicted in Mardell that even if Summers were rejected in 
favor of the date-of-discovery approach, employers would still be 
319 Id.; see also Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236 n.28 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citing law review articles supporting proposition that "resume fraud is a serious and 
recurrent problem facing employers"), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 
(1995); Rubinstein, supra note 312, at 1 n.2 (noting survey finding 10% of firms experience 
application fraud). 
380 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37. 
381 Id. at 1236 n.26. 
382 Id. This advice can still be implemented by employers, although they must be careful 
to avoid the appearance ofretaliatory investigations. The EEOC takes the position that such 
investigations nullify the date-of-discovery cutoff on backpay and justify imposition of 
punitive damages. EEOC: GUIDANCE ON AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE, supra note 335, at 
7334-36. 
383 William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause and Found Defense: Using 
Evidence Discovered After an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LAB. 
LAW. 31, 41-42 ( 1993). 
384 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37. 
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given the same advice and the deterrence objective of the laws 
would still be frustrated to some extent. 385 Has that prediction 
proven true? Of course it has. Employers are as likely to receive, 
and heed, such advice when the result is a significant reduction in 
their liability as when the result is an avoidance of all liability. 
For example, one recent publication advised that, in conducting 
aggressive discovery and in assessing a plaintiffs damage claims in 
a sexual harassment suit, "[a]ll information included on [the] 
plaintiffs employment application [is] still relevant to front and 
back pay claims after [McKennon]."386 
The effect of employers' exploitation of after-acquired evidence 
under the McKennon rule probably will not be confined to limiting 
the recovery of employees whose claims are resolved at trial. 
Rather, as with Hicks, victims of discrimination will sue less often, 
and those who sue and settle will do so for less. 387 An employer 
is likely to advise current and former employees contemplating suit 
that misrepresentation or other misconduct will substantially limit 
any recovery. This preemptive strike will more likely dissuade 
potential plaintiffs from suing, or persuade plaintiffs to settle early 
and for less, than will an explanation of the employer-friendly 
interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis under Hicks. 
While potential or actual plaintiffs may not understand an 
explanation of Hicks, there is some visceral "punch" to the "you had 
it coming"388 rationale of McKennon. Feeling ashamed of their 
misconduct, or perhaps embarrassed at being "caught," former 
employees may give up their claims with a whimper, accepting de 
386 Id. at 1236-38. 
386 Hope B. Eastman, A Look at Damages from the Perspective of the Defense Bar, in 
SEXUAL lIARAsSMENT LITIGATION 239 (P.L.I. Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. 520, 1995). 
387 See supra note 245 and accompanying text (predicting as effect of Hicks fewer suits 
and lower settlements). Perhaps the difference is that those who do sue will be less likely 
to lose their cases unless the court conducts the trial such that the after-acquired evidence 
taints the factfinder's consideration of the liability issue. After the Mardell judgment was 
vacated to be reconsidered in light of McKennon, the Third Circuit declined to instruct the 
trial court on how to conduct the trial on remand. The court stated, "While bifurcation may 
sometimes be advisable as a vehicle to insure that after-acquired evidence not be improperly 
used d�ring the liability phase, in other cases cautionary instructions or stipulations may 
render it unnecessary." Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1073 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
388 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232. 
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minimis settlement offers, or they may forego their claims altogeth­
er. Thus, the likely effect of the McKennon approach on the 
workplace is both undercompensation of discrimination victims and 
underdeterrence of discriminatory practices. Employers, armed 
with the weaponry McKennon places at their disposal, are able to 
operate not wholly under the freedom of employment at will, but 
close to it. 
Fortunately, McKennon does provide one brake on these projected 
results. McKennon may be read as authorizing lower courts to 
examine the objective reasonableness of an employer's asserted 
reasons for discharge. The Court stated that "[ w ]here an employer 
seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must 
first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the 
employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds 
alone if the employer had known of it at the time of discharge."389 
It seems unlikely that the Court meant to authorize courts to 
second-guess employer decisions on the ground that the conduct 
was insufficiently egregious to justify the adverse action. That 
interpretation would be contrary to the Court's admonition in 
Furnco that courts are incompetent to devise less discriminatory 
practices for employers.390 
More likely, that statement meant that a court may inquire into 
whether employers have consistently applied their stated practic­
es, 391 regardless of whether those practices are objectively reason­
able. This interpretation, rather than that permitting an examina­
tion of objective reasonableness, is further supported by the Court's 
realization that it needed to address the prospect of routine 
employer undertakings of extensive discovery into a plaintiffs 
background or performance. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution 
of that problem is hardly reassuring. In one sentence, the Court 
explained that a court's authorization to award attorney's fees by 
statute and to impose sanctions under Rule 1 1  in appropriate cases 
389 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 (1995). 
390 See supra notes 136-149 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco's admonition that 
courts not second-guess employers). 
391 Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 291. On remand of Mardell, the Third Circuit 
refused to "opine on plaintiffs contentions as to the type or quantum of evidence (such as a 
policy or custom) that [the defendant] must adduce to establish that it would in fact have 
fired her upon discovering her resume fraud." Mardell, 65 F.3d at 1073 n.3. 
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"will deter most abuses. "392 How will those putative safeguards 
deter most abuses? The threat of an award of attorney's fees is 
hardly new, and will play little or no role when employers intimi­
date potential plaintiffs into early settlements or into not suing at 
all. As for Rule 1 1  sanctions, the Court's statement is enigmatic: 
How can discovery directed at information the Court has deemed 
relevant to the limitation of remedies be subject to sanctions?393 
In short, the Court's half-hearted attempt to address the "not . . .  
insubstantial [concern]"394 regarding employer exploitation of the 
Court's treatment of after-acquired evidence does not begin to 
address the practical, day-to-day subordination of federal employ­
ment discrimination law.395 
The McKennon Court's less-than-meticulous attention to a 
significant problem created by its decision is in stark contrast to 
the plurality's painstaking efforts to allay employers' fears of quota 
requirements when, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,396 the 
Court extended disparate impact analysis to subjective employment 
criteria. To protect employers against quota requirements, the 
plurality in Watson was willing to essentially "dismember" the 
disparate impact framework. The Court in McKennon makes no 
such herculean efforts to protect victims of discriminatory employ­
ment practices from a more realistic threat. 
Having traced the subordination of federal employment discrimi­
nation law to employment at will from Furnco through McKennon, 
I next consider the future of discrimination law. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Are we willing to expend whatever resources are neces­
sary to put an end to workplace discrimination ? Are we 
fully committed to the elimination of discrimination even 
at the expense of other legitimate concerns ?397 
392 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 887. 
393 Davis, supra note 19, at 404. 
394 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887. 
396 Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 292. 
396 487 U.S. 977 (1988); see also supra notes 150-159 and accompanying text (analyzing 
plurality opinion in Watson). 
397 Gregory, supra note 52, at 68. 
1996] EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 383 
If the Supreme Court does not take the lead in pronouncing that 
federal employment discrimination law embodies vital public policy, 
that law will continue to become less effective and less meaningful. 
Although in the past, supporters of discrimination law have looked 
to Congress to overcome unfavorable Court decisions, that will not 
be an adequate solution for the current state of affairs. In the 
short term, the current Congress does not appear to be favorably 
disposed toward federal labor and employment law. Perhaps in the 
long term, Congress may react to Supreme Court decisions that 
subordinate discrimination law to employment-at-will principles. 
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the bills introduced to 
overturn Hicks are evidence of this.398 However, Hicks and 
McKennon demonstrate that "the Court is inherently more agile 
than Congress."399 As evidenced by the legislative history of both 
the 1991 Act and its unsuccessful 1990 precursor, Congress cannot 
respond expeditiously enough to adequately protect the rights of 
discrimination victims from a multitude of adverse Court deci­
sions. 400 Congress may try in the future, by giving us "the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1998, 2005, and 2010."401 Until the Supreme Court 
decides and declares, however, that federal employment discrimina­
tion law displaces employment at will and employer prerogatives 
to the extent necessary to achieve the goal of eradicating discrimi­
nation in the workplace through compensation and deterrence, 
there will not be consistent and effective enforcement of that 
law.402 
In the meantime, the previously discussed decisions of the Court 
have not left the lower courts without any choices. For example, in 
applying Hicks, lower federal courts can interpret the Court's 
holding narrowly. There is nothing in the Hicks opinion that 
requires courts to impose a pretext-plus standard in deciding a 
398 See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing legislation proposed to overturn 
Hicks). 
399 Brookins, supra note 69, at 943. 
400 Id. at 943-44 (positing Congress "simply cannot respond to each case in a barrage of 
judicial attacks on its civil rights legislation"). 
'01 Culp, supra note 107, at 967. 402 Cf. id. at 1010 ("They will not be the last bills or the last decisions by the Court in this 
area as long as the Court is dominated by a conservative majority intent on rewriting 
employment discrimination law and committed to avoiding the race question in that effort."). 
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defendant's motion for summary judgment. In applying McKen­
non's general rules regarding the limiting effects of after-acquired 
evidence, courts may interpret the Court's requirement-that an 
employer must, in order to use after-acquired evidence, first 
establish that it would have terminated the employee on those 
grounds alone-as authorizing courts to scrutinize the employer's 
assertions carefully and perhaps to evaluate the objective reason­
ableness of those assertions. Furthermore, McKennon's authoriza­
tion that courts "can consider taking into further account extraordi­
nary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of 
either party"4°3 remains to be fleshed out by the lower federal 
courts. 
However, for the lower courts to further eradicate discrimination 
within the Supreme Court's framework, or for the Court to develop 
a new vision and a new voice to achieve the purposes of federal 
discrimination law, judges and justices must re-evaluate their 
values and determine that it is appropriate, indeed congressionally 
mandated, that employment at will be displaced to the extent 
necessary to achieve the goals of employment discrimination law. 
Several possibilities explain why judges have decided that 
employment discrimination law should be subordinated to employ­
ment at will. First, some judges simply believe that the common­
law rights flowing from property and freedom-of-contract principles 
are more important and more deserving oflegal protection. Second, 
some judges think it is impossible for the goals of discrimination 
law to be achieved, because market forces simply cannot be 
harnessed by that law. Third, many judges see the burgeoning 
caseload of discrimination claims404 and conclude that the courts 
cannot effectively handle such a load. Fourth, considering both the 
magnitude of the caseload and the types of claims, judges may 
conclude that many discrimination claims are meritless. Moreover, 
judges may consider the type of discrimination actions (now far 
more based on allegedly discriminatory discharge than on refusal 
to hire405) and conclude that discrimination law is no longer 
:
 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 ( 1995). 
See generally Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7 (analyzing growth and changing 
nature of employment discrimination claims from 1960s to 1980s). 
406 Id. at 984. 
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fulfilling its historic purpose, instead having become a series of 
wrongful-discharge statutes protecting only persons in specified 
classes. Finally, some judges may believe that invidious discrimi­
nation in the workplace is no longer a significant problem. 406 The 
judiciary must candidly reconsider the foregoing views in light of 
the strong public policy manifested in federal employment discrimi­
nation law. 
Nineteen ninety-four marked the thirtieth anniversary of the 
oldest of the federal employment discrimination laws. Thirty years 
hence what will we observe? How many civil-rights restoration acts 
will there be? What will be the track record of the courts, primari­
ly the Supreme Court, in this area of the law? The answers lie in 
the resolution of the relationship between the common-law doctrine 
of employment at will and the federal employment discrimination 
statutes. At this time, the future does not look promising for 
federal discrimination law. 
406 See Gregory, supra note 52, at 68 ("The federal judiciary has become increasingly 
conservative and increasingly sympathetic to institutional concerns. Many judges may feel 
that too many discrimination suits are brought and that too many lack a substantial 
evidentiary foundation. Some may even believe that discrimination is no longer a significant 
societal problem."). 
